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ABSTRACT 
This study analyses the impact of initial return, post-issue liquidity, and third-party certification on 
downside risk of initial public offerings (IPOs). Downside risk, measured by value-at-risk (VaR) and 
conditional value-at-risk (CVaR), draws upon Extreme Value Theory (EVT) and the Peak over 
Threshold (POT) approach. Initial return and downside risk exhibit a positive association which is 
consistent with a market-overreaction explanation but contradicts the validity of signalling models in 
which underpricing acts as a costly and difficult to imitate signal of firm quality. Post-issue liquidity, 
measured by seven distinct definitions to capture different aspects of liquidity, also has a positive 
association with downside risk. In contrast, third-party certification, measured by the reputation and 
size of underwriter syndicate and venture capital-backed IPOs do not persistently explain the 
variation in downside risk. Quantile regression analysis constitutes more rigour in the testing and 
offers new insights into the sensitivity among variables and their covariates at different quantiles of 
downside risk. While initial return affects downside risk evenly across the entire distribution, 
quantile covariates for liquidity measures are statistically significant and generally outside the 
confidence interval of least squares regression coefficients. Sensitivity of liquidity measures is greater 
towards the upper end of the downside risk distribution. 
Keywords: Initial public offerings; downside risk; initial return; liquidity; third-party certification; 
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1 Introduction 
There is broad consensus in the literature that initial public offerings (IPOs) have historically experi -
enced relatively low stock returns over three to five years following flotation in relation to comparable 
seasoned firms and the stock market in general (Ritter, 1991; Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist, 1994; 
Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001).1 Existing research offers at least three 
plausible explanations for this persistent average underperformance. Firstly, a risk -based explanation of 
low average post-issue returns presumes rational investor behaviour. Studies such as Brav, Geczy, and 
Gompers (2000) and Eckbo and Norli (2005) show that low average post -issue stock returns is not a 
distinct anomaly. Rather, these returns are, as advocated in Fama and French (1992), consistent with a 
more pervasive pattern that is observable in the wider populat ion of publicly listed companies 
'This new issue puzzle is well documented in developed stock markets around the world. However, in less 
developed stock markets, the evidence of long-run underperformance is less conclusive. For example, IPOs in some 
emerging markets appear to outperform rather than underperform the average stock market in the long run 
(e.g., Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001). 
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whereby small growth stocks experience lower than expected returns. In this instance, low average post-
issue returns are commensurate with the issuers’ typical risk profile, captured by existing asset pricing 
models and their corresponding factors, including firm size and book-to-market ratio. 
Secondly, low average post-issue returns presume the ability of market timing and the presence of 
some irrational investor behaviour. Studies such as Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999) and Michaely 
and Womack (1999) advocate that issuers can time their offerings and raise extra capital from selling 
overpriced equity, while Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) show that IPO firms engage in earnings 
manipulation in the accounting period leading up to flotation. Both instances generate high initial 
return, followed by low average post-issue returns due to IPO overvaluation or investor overreaction 
when prices adjust to a new price equilibrium that reflects the intrinsic value of stocks. In this 
explanation of long-run IPO underperformance, low stock returns are more indicative of mispricing 
by issuing firms and their underwriters when pricing offerings or indicative of investor over-optimism 
rather than that of a risk-based dimension in the aftermarket. 
Thirdly, studies such as Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) and Eckbo and Norli (2005) analyse 
the impact of liquidity on IPO returns. Generally, more liquid stocks experience minimal delay in 
the execution of trades. These trades have a minimal impact on price changes. Also, more liquid 
stocks have smaller transaction costs, including commissions and bid-ask spreads (Aggarwal, 
Krigman, and Womack, 2002; Cao, Field, and Hanka, 2004; Eckbo and Norli, 2005). According to 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986), expected return is an increasing and concave function of the bid -
ask spread. In the IPO context, Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) argue that issuers may tolerate 
leaving money on the table when going public through underpricing (initial return) to create a more 
liquid aftermarket for their shares. Initial return increases liquidity in the  secondary market 
(Bodnaruk et al., 2008; Mantecon and Poon, 2009). Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) make a direct 
link between initial return, liquidity, and long-run post-issue returns. Eckbo and Norli (2005) also 
corroborate this link in an earlier study. In their analysis, they show that new issues underperform in 
the long-run because these IPOs are, on average, more liquid than non-issuing firms when matched 
on firm size and book-to-market ratio. 
While existing studies have analysed the risk-return profile of IPOs, including the validity of 
signalling models, liquidity, and third-party certification, the literature leaves several as of yet unan-
swered questions. To begin with, we do not know much about IPO downside risk post-offering. Yet, 
identifying and estimating downside risk is essential for risk management and asset allocation pur-
poses. Only very few studies employ dedicated risk measures. A notable exception is Neill, Perfect, 
and Wiles (1999). They use firm-specific betas as estimates of systematic IPO risk. No study in the 
extant literature applies any of the more conventional measures of downside risk such as, for example, 
value-at-risk (VaR) or conditional value-at-risk (CVaR).2 
In addition, we do not know whether initial return, post-issue liquidity, and third-party certification, 
or indeed all three state variables simultaneously explain downside risk. On the one hand, high initial 
return, followed by low post-issue downside risk would be consistent with the signalling of firm quality 
(Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989). On the other hand, a positive relationship between initial return and 
downside risk would embody market timing abilities or market over-reaction to overpriced IPOs. 
Alternatively, liquidity measures capture different aspects of post-issue liquidity (Krigman, Shaw, and 
Womack, 1999; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998), while third-party certi-
fication in terms of underwriter reputation (Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Carter and Manaster, 1990) and 
venture-capital backing (Bessler and Seim, 2012) should reduce downside risk. There is a notable 
absence in the literature that analyses the relationship between these state variables and downside risk, 
while controlling for firm and deal characteristics as well as contemporaneous stock market conditions. 
Finally, not only do we not have an understanding of the impact of initial return, liquidity, and 
third-party certification on downside risk, we also do not know whether and how the state variables 
impact on different quantiles of the downside risk distribution. Traditional estimation techniques such 
as ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) applied in Hahn, Ligon, and 
Rhodes (2013) can only offer a conditional mean view of the relationship among variables . These 
traditional techniques impose restrictive assumptions on how covariates can influence the conditional  
2CVaR is also known as Expected Shortfall or Expected Tail Loss.  
distribution of state variables. Quantile regressions relax this limitation and offer a more complete 
characterization of the stochastic relationship among variables. A more complete characterization in 
quantile regression analysis is possible because we estimate the relationship between independent and 
dependent variables conditional on quantiles of the dependent variable. Since the seminal paper of 
Koenker and Bassett (1978), quantile regression has increasingly become a complementary approach to 
the conventional mean estimation techniques.3 To-date, we have no clear understanding of the un-
derlying characterization of the stochastic relationship between the three state variables and downside 
risk of IPOs. 
In light of these unanswered questions, my study makes the following, distinct contributions. 
Firstly, I use VaR and CVaR to analyse the downside risk of post-offering IPO returns. Diagnostic 
tests reveal skewed, leptokurtic (heavy-tailed) stock return distributions. More specifically, while 
extreme negative stock returns are relatively rare, they occur more frequently and are larger in size than 
the Gaussian distribution would predict. To overcome the distributional characteristics of post-issue 
stock returns, I use Extreme Value Theory (EVT) and the Peak over Threshold (POT) approach to fit 
these distributions using the maximum likelkihood method to calculate the downside risk (see McNeil, 
Frey, and Embrechts, 2015). POT is the preferred method in the present context because this approach 
uses data more efficiently than alternative approaches.4 I estimate conventional 95% percentile and 
99% percentile confidence levels of the return distributions to measure downside risk.5 Estimating 
downside risk of post-issue IPO stock returns in the context of this study has not attracted any 
attention in the extant literature. 
Secondly, I analyse whether initial return, post-offering liquidity and/or third party certification, 
while controlling for firm and deal characteristics as well as contemporary stock market conditions, 
can explain downside risk. To the best of my knowledge, my study is the first to analyse this 
relationship. Estimating the impact of these two stochastic variables on IPO downside risk is essential 
for risk-management and asset allocation purposes. On the one hand, a negative association between 
initial return and downside risk would be consistent with the signalling argument of Grinblatt and 
Hwang (1989). On the other hand, a positive association between initial return and downside risk 
would be consistent with a market over-reaction on the side of investors or mispricing on the side of 
issuing firms and their underwriters. Observing such a positive relationship would also corroborate 
earlier empirical findings reported in studies such as Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999), Michaely 
and Womack (1999), and Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998). A positive association between liquidity and 
downside risk would be consistent with studies such as Eckbo and Norli (2005). Their study reports 
an inverse relationship between liquidity and post-issue stock returns. New issues underperform in the 
long-run because IPOs have greater liquidity than comparable seasoned firms. Unfortunately, liquidity 
is difficult to define. Accordingly, I use different definitions to capture various aspects of liquidity and 
to better understand its impact on downside risk. To begin with, I use spread based liquidity measures, 
including proportional quoted spread and proportional realised spread (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001; Hahn, Ligon, and 
Rhodes, 2013; Huberman and Halka, 2001; Rubia and Sanchis-Marco, 2013). In addition, I use price 
impact based liquidity measures (Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Glosten and Harris, 1988; Hahn, 
Ligon, and Rhodes, 2013; Kyle, 1985). Finally, I use trading volume related liquidity measures, 
including the ratio of returns to trading volume (Amihud, 2002; Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes, 2013; 
Rubia and Sanchis-Marco, 2013) and the number of shares traded in relation to the number of shares 
outstanding (Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe, 1998; Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes, 2013; Rubia and Sanchis-
Marco, 2013). 
Thirdly, I test whether an association between downside risk, initial return, liquidity, and third - 
3Previous applications of quantile regressions to value-at-risk include the studies of Bao, Tae-Hwy, and Salto˘glu 
(2006), Fuertes and Olmo (2013), and Jeon and Taylor (2013). Other applications of quantile regressions include the 
modelling of return distributions, volatility and equity premium (Hua and Manzan, 2013; Pedersen, 2015; Rubia and 
Sanchis-Marco, 2013), risk and stress testing (Bernal, Gnabo, and Guilmin, 2014; Covas, Rump, and Zakrajˇsek, 2014; 
Klomp and Haan, 2012), diversification and risk-adjusted performance (Lee and Li, 2012), and foreign exchange rates 
(Baur, 2013; Nikolaou, 2008).  
4Alternative approaches consist of fitting one of the three standard extreme value distributions (Frechet, Weibull or 
Gumbel). 
595% comes from RiskMetrics and 99% comes from Basel Accord.  
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party certification persists if corrected for potential endogeneity between dependent and state variables. 
The literature does not provide a conclusive guidance as to whether these stochastic variables are 
endogenous to downside risk. Some studies observe endogeneity between initial return and post-issue 
liquidity (Ellul and Pagano, 2006; Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes, 2013). This suggests that controlling for 
endogeneity is potentially important in the present context. If stochastic variables are endogenous then 
they would require instrumenting in the estimation process. 
Fourthly, I analyse whether initial, post-issue liquidity, and third-party certification affect the 
downside risk evenly across the distribution of dependent variables or whether different quantiles bet-
ter explain downside risk. In particular, I test the predictability of downside risk at various quantiles in 
the left tail of the conditional distribution. I use quantile regressions to analyse tail-predictability 
without departing significantly from traditional predictive least squares-based regressions. The latter 
technique imposes restrictive assumptions on how covariates can influence the conditional distribu-
tions of response variables. Quantile regressions relax this limitation. They offer a more complete 
characterization of the stochastic relationship among initial return, post-issue liquidity, third-party 
certification, and downside risk. Quantile regressions thus provide more robust and efficient estimates 
in some non-Gaussian settings. Since the seminal paper of Koenker and Bassett (1978), quantile 
regression analysis has increasingly become a complementary approach to the conventional mean es-
timation methods. However, until now, we do not know how initial return, post-issue liquidity, and 
third-party certification impact on downside risk at different quantiles. My study therefore carries out a 
more robust empirical test with − in this context − a novel applied estimation method. 
2 Relationship to Existing Research 
My study relates to various different streams of research and makes several distinct contributions to the 
existing literature. Previous research has estimated downside risk using different variable definitions and 
methodologies. Firstly, this study relates to the literature on quantifying downside risk and, more 
precisely, to the body of research devoted to measure initial return as well as post-issue return and risk. 
To begin with, information asymmetry between market participants surrounding IPO values leaves the 
new issues market subject to Akerlof’s (1970) classic adverse selection problem. This adverse selection 
problem manifests itself in persistent average initial return across capital markets and time periods.6 The 
literature offers various explanations for persistent average initial return.7 More specifically, Brav and 
Gompers (1997), Friesen and Swift (2009), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Ritter (1991), and Teoh, Welch, 
and Wong (1998) explain initial return as a consequence of mispricing between an issuer and 
underwriter as a result of overoptimism about firm value that creates excess demand in shares, pushes 
up prices which then leads to average initial return when post-issue trading begins. Prices then revert 
back to fundamental firm value post-issue, which then translates into subsequent average long-run post-
issue underperformance between three and five years. In addition, studies such as Chen and William Jr 
(2008), Beneda and Zhang (2009), Falconieri, Murphy, and Weaver (2009), Gleason, Johnston, and 
Madura (2008), and Neill, Perfect, and Wiles (1999) link post-issue risk with performance. For example, 
Gleason, Johnston, and Madura (2008) find a correlation between post-issue betas and initial return. 
These findings imply that IPOs need to offer initial return to compensate post-issue risk in addition to 
risk that comes from ex ante uncertainty if investors want to purchase in the primary and/or secondary 
market. Beneda and Zhang (2009) report a negative association between the level of initial idiosyncratic 
volatility and the post-issue volatility change. Initially, low quality firms have a greater increase in 
volatility. Their study reports that initial return and post-issue returns have a positive relationship to the 
corresponding idiosyncratic risk levels. Also, Beneda and Zhang (2009) report that higher long-run post-
issue performance has a positive relationship with lower levels of initial risk as well as decreasing risk in 
the first year after flotation. The study therefore implies firm-specific 
6Initial return is also known as underpricing. Initial return is the percentage change from the offer price to the post-
issue market price on the first day of trading. Evidence of persistent average initial return is available from Banerjee, 
Dai, and Shrestha (2011), Ritter (2003), and Jay R. Ritter’s web site (http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter) that has 
regular updates of Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994). 
7See, for example, Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Baron (1982), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Rock (1986), and 
Welch (1989). 
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changes post-issue. Initial return appears to compensate investors for acquiring costly information. In 
addition, ex post value uncertainty in the post-issue market continues to persist for some time. 
Falconieri, Murphy, and Weaver (2009) report that controlling for this ex post uncertainty improves the 
explanatory power of post-issue IPO performance. In their study, they use various definitions of 
liquidity measures as proxy variables for ex post uncertainty. The literature reports a gradual decline in 
ex post uncertainty and risk as IPOs become more seasoned. For example, Neill, Perfect, and Wiles 
(1999) report that individual average IPO betas decline over time. The authors attribute this decline to 
new issues becoming more seasoned rather than from the delisting of high-value beta IPOs. In a 
related study, P´astor and Stambaugh (2003) demonstrate that stocks with higher liquidity betas have 
greater expected returns. 
Secondly, this study also relates to the literature on measuring liquidity in general and, more 
precisely, to the body of research on the impact of liquidity on post-issue IPO performance. The 
literature offers a range of definitions to capture various aspects of liquidity. These definitions fall into 
three broad categories: (1) spread based liquidity measures, (2) price impact based liquidity measures, 
and (3) trading volume based liquidity measures (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam, 1996; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001; Falconieri, Murphy, and Weaver, 
2009; Eckbo and Norli, 2005; Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes, 2013; Huberman and Halka, 2001; Rubia 
and Sanchis-Marco, 2013). To begin with, Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) report that initial return 
increases the liquidity of IPO shares in the secondary market over the first year of trading. These 
findings are robust regardless of the time horizon used to calculate liquidity after having addressed 
endogeneity concerns between liquidity and initial return. Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) use no 
fewer than eight different definitions of liquidity that fall into the three broad categories identified 
above. Before the study of Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013), Falconieri, Murphy, and Weaver (2009) 
use spread based liquidity measures and volume based liquidity measures. These ex post measures of 
uncertainty improve the explanatory power of post-issue IPO performance. In an earlier analysis, Ellul 
and Pagano (2006) claim that the less liquid the aftermarket and the less predictable post-issue 
liquidity, the greater will be the initial return of an IPO. When comparing post-issue IPO performance 
with a seasoned control sample, Eckbo and Norli (2005) claim that IPOs underperform because they 
are more liquid than their counterparts matched on size and book-to-market. Finally, the findings of 
Eckbo and Norli (2005) are consistent with those reported previously in Corwin, Harris, and Lipson 
(2004). In their study, Corwin, Harris, and Lipson (2004) examine the post-issue liquidity of IPOs. The 
authors find a steady increase of depth relative to volume and percentage spreads increase in the 
secondary market following an IPO. 
Thirdly, this study relates to the literature on third-party certification of firm quality. Agents that 
participate regularly in the IPO market such as underwriters and venture capitalists can build up rep-
utation capital to certify IPO firm quality. Using more prestigious underwriters and venture-capital 
backing should reduce the ex ante valuation uncertainty and hence diminish post-issue downside risk. 
Studies that support the certification role of underwriter reputation in reducing ex ante valuation un-
certainty include Megginson and Weiss (1991), Carter and Manaster (1990), and Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001). In contrast, Beatty and Welch (1996) find no support for an underwriter certification role. 
Therefore, it remains to be tested whether the present analysis finds a negative association between 
underwriter reputation and downside risk. It also remains to be tested whether the size of the under-
writing syndicate, measured by the number of participating investment banks, can explain downside 
risk. The number of syndicate members involved in the underwriting should enhance the visibility and 
coverage of an IPO and hence reduce downside risk. Analysing the impact of venture-capital backing 
awaits investigation and is important because of the mixed findings in the extant literature whether or 
not the presence of venture capitalists reduces or increases ex ante uncertainty surrounding the valua-
tion of firms. On the one hand, studies that report a reduction in ex ante uncertainty and hence initial 
return include Arthurs et al. (2009), Barry et al. (1990), Brav and Gompers (1997), Krishnan et al. 
(2011), Lerner (1994), Megginson and Weiss (1991), and Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013). On the other 
hand, studies that do not find support in favour third-party certification by venture capitalists include 
Liu and Ritter (2011) and Hamao, Packer, and Ritter (2000). 
Fourthly, this study belongs to the literature devoted to downside risk modelling in the general 
6 
context of quantile regression analysis. Existing research papers in the non-IPO literature use various 
methodologies. In a recent study, Rubia and Sanchis-Marco (2013) report conditional tail predictability 
of downside risk using different liquidity measures and trading conditions. The authors apply quantile 
regression methodology in their analysis. Predictability of downside risk is robust to various 
representative market portfolios and different testing procedures. However, the extent of predictability 
varies across different quantiles in the left tail of these conditional return distributions. In addition, 
Rubia and Sanchis-Marco (2013) report that volume-related variables are good predictors of well-
diversified portfolios, including the market portfolio and small-cap stocks, while liquidity measures are 
more accurate when forecasting the tail of conditional return distributions of value portfolios. Using an 
alternative model specification, Taylor (2008) employs exponentially weighted quantile regressions to 
estimate VaR and CVaR. This approach outperforms GARCH-based methods and CAViaR models for a 
sample of ten stock return series. Some research papers perform more detailed test on the performance 
of different model specifications. For instance, Bao, Tae-Hwy, and Salto˘glu (2006) investigate the 
prediction accuracy of various downside risk models, including quantile regression based approaches. 
The authors report that the RiskMetrics model performs well in tranquil periods, whereas some 
Extreme Value Theory (EVT) based models perform better during more volatile market periods. In 
another comparative study, Bao, Tae-Hwy, and Salto˘glu (2006) report that CaViaR quantile regression 
models of Engle and Managnelli (2004) have predictive power when forecasting VaR. Yet another 
comparative study is Taylor (2000). He estimates the conditional probability distribution of multiperiod 
financial returns using quantile regressions. In particular, his methodology involves a neural network 
approach to estimate non-linear quantiles. This approach offers a potential alternative to GARCH-
based quantile estimates. 
My study contributes to these strands of the extant literature in several ways. Firstly, this study 
measures VaR and CVaR to analyse the downside risk of post-issue IPO returns using Extreme Value 
Theory (EVT) and the Peak over Threshold (POT) approach. The extant literature does not provide any 
evidence on the downside risk of new issues. Yet, identifying and estimating the downside risk makes 
an important contribution to existing knowledge on the long-run performance of IPOs. Secondly, my 
analysis examines whether initial return, post-issue liquidity and/or third-party certification can 
explain downside risk of IPOs. There is a notable absence in the literature that analyses the 
relationship between these state variables with downside risk. This study employs different definitions 
of liquidity to capture various aspects of this measure and its relative importance with IPO downside 
risk. Thirdly, my study reveals and extends the current knowledge in the literature on whether initial 
return, post-issue liquidity, and/or third party certification affect downside risk evenly across the 
distribution of dependent variables and whether quantile regression models improve the tail 
predictability of VaR and CVaR. Quantile regressions constitute a more robust test of the stochastic 
relationships among variables than conventional least squares regression analysis. 
3 Downside Risk 
I use Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) to measure downside risk of post-
issue IPO returns. VaR is an estimate of the maximum loss over a given holding period (t) within a 
fixed confidence level c. Mathematically, VaR at the 100(1 − c)% confidence level is defined as the 
upper 100c percentile of the loss distribution X of post-issue IPO returns. Following Artzner et al. 
(1999), I define VaR at the 100(1 − c)% confidence level [V aRc (X)] as: 
V aRc (X) = sup{x|P [X ≥ x] > c} (1) 
where sup {x | M} is the upper limit of x given event M, while sup {x | P [X ≥ x] > c} represents the 
upper 100c percentile of the loss distribution X of post-issue IPO returns. 
In addition to VaR, I also use CVaR. CVaR is the expected loss beyond the VaR threshold. 
Following Artzner et al. (1999), I define CVaR as: 
CV aRc (X) = E [X | X ≥ V aRc (X)] (2) 
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CVaR measures the average loss of post-issue IPO returns when the loss exceeds the VaR level. Artzner 
et al. (1999) recommend this measure to alleviate the problems inherent in VaR. 
The risk of extreme losses of post-issue IPO returns and their relationship is at the heart of this 
study. Extreme losses represent a significant downside risk to investors. For that reason, I use Extreme 
Value Theory (EVT) in conjunction with the Peak over Threshold (POT) method to capture extreme 
losses and downside risk (for details, see, McNeil, Frey, and Embrechts, 2015). EVT provides a 
conceptual framework that can accommodate extreme observations. To begin with, this approach 
overcomes unreliable estimates as a result of sparse data on extreme outcomes. In addition, EVT also 
allows a statistical quantification of extreme events that have values beyond those observable over a 
limited time interval. The POT method to model exceedances is the most frequently approach used in 
finance (see, for example, Gupta and Liang, 2005). Suppose X is a random loss with distribution 
function F (x), and u is a threshold value, then we can define the distribution of excess losses over the 
threshold u as: 
F (x + u) − F (u) 
 Fu (x) = Pr{X − u x|X > u} =  ________________________________ (3) 
1 − F (u) 
for x > 0. As u gets larger, the Fu (x) distribution converges to a GPD. This convergence follows from 
the Gnedenko-Pickands-Balkema-deHaan theorem (see, Dowd, 2005). The cumulative distribution 
function of GPD is: 
{ 
1 − (1 + x//3)−1/ξ Gξ,β (x) = (4) 
1 − exp (−x//3) if =6 0 
= 0 
where G (x) refer to exceedances, defined for x ~ 0 for ~ 0 and 0 x −/3/ for < 0. /3 
is a positive scale parameter. is a shape or tail index parameter which can be positive, zero, or  
negative. I fit this GDP by means of maximum likelihood method to those observations which exceed 
the threshold in the tail of the loss distribution. I use a threshold of 0.1 to assign 10% to the tail of the 
loss distribution. 
After fitting the GDP to the exceedances, I use this distribution to calculate VaR and CVaR for 
the loss distribution of returns. Mathematically, the loss distribution function F (x) over the 
threshold u is: 
F (x) = [1−F(u)]Gξ,β(x−u)+F(u) (5) 
where x > u with F (u) estimated empirically from post-issue IPO returns. Eq. (5) represents a 
parametric model for the tail of the original loss distribution above the threshold u. 
4  D a t a  
My sample consists of 2,413 U.S. IPOs between 1985−2012 with an aggregate gross proceeds of $248.7 
billion. Four data sources contribute to the construction of this sample. Firstly, the New Issues database 
from Thomson One Banker provides details on IPOs and their corresponding deal characteristics. I 
exclude IPOs of Real Estate Investment Trusts, American Depository Receipts, Master Limited 
Partnerships, closed-end funds, unit offers, and new issues with an offer price smaller than $5.8 
Secondly, the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes provide stock market data, including 
stock prices and trading information to calculate initial return and liquidity measures. Each IPO must 
have at least 150 days of trading activity following an offer.9 Thirdly, Compustat from Standard and 
Poor’s database offers complementary financial statement data for those observations that have missing 
values in Thomson One Banker’s New Issues database. Fourthly, Jay Ritter’s web 
8SEC refers to common stock that trade below $5 as penny shares. These stocks are in the highest risk category for equity 
investment which involves a speculative element that prompted Congress to pass laws against brokers making buy or sell 
recommendations on these shares. 
9Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) also impose a 150-day minimum sampling criteria in their analysis to calculate liquidity 
measures. 
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site provides information on underwriter reputation, issuer founding dates, and aggregate initial return of IPOs 
in the new issues market.10 
Details on sample distribution by year as well as by industry sector are available from Table I and 
Table II. The sample covers a variety of industry sectors. No single year and no single industry sector 
dominate the sample distribution which could introduce a sample bias or diminish the generalizability of 
the findings. 
[ Table I ] 
Both the number of IPOs and gross proceeds across the sample period follow cycles similar to those 
reported elsewhere in the literature (see, Lowry, 2003; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Yung, C ¸olak, and 
Wei, 2008). We can observe high IPO activity between 1992 and 1999, whereas the period before and 
after this interval shows fewer new issues and relatively smaller gross proceeds. The highest 
concentration in the number of offerings occurs in 1996. A total of 260 companies obtain a stock 
market listing during that year which corresponds to 10.77% of all IPOs in the sample. The highest 
concentration in gross proceeds occurs in 1999. Gross proceeds amount to $23.2 billion which 
corresponds to 9.34% of aggregate gross proceeds during that year. The year 1985 has the lowest 
concentration in both, the number of IPOs as well as the amount of gross proceeds.  
[ Table II ] 
IPO concentration across sectors, based on Fama and French’s (1992) four -digit industry sector clas-
sification, is comparable to those firms trading on national stock exchanges at the time of these new 
issues. The top three industry sectors, by number of IPOs, are: Computer Software, Retail, and 
Business Services; while the top three industry sectors, by gross proceeds, are: Computer Software, 
Trading, and Communication. These industry sectors account for approximately 30% of IPOs by 
number and by gross proceeds. In contrast, both Precious Metals and Fabricated Products have the 
fewest number of IPOs as well as the smallest amount of gross proceeds. 
4.1 Variable Definitions and Measurements 
Variable definitions on downside risk, initial return, liquidity measures, third-party certification proxy 
measures, proxy variables on ex ante uncertainty surrounding IPO value, deal characteristics, and 
contemporaneous stock market conditions at the time of flotation along with data sources are available from 
Table III. 
[ Table III ] 
While the existing literature offers several variables that help to explain IPO value and persistent average 
initial return, we do not know the importance of these stochastic variables on downside risk.11 
I measure downside risk by value-at-risk (VaR) and conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) for confidence 
levels c = {0.95, 0.99} as shown in Panel A of Table III. Estimates of VaR and CVaR use Extreme Value 
Theory (EVT) and the Peak over Threshold (POT) approach as explained in Section 3. 
To analyse the significance of initial return, stock liquidity, and third -party certification on down-
side risk, I rely on variables from the literature that explain the long-run performance of IPOs. Initial 
return in Panel B captures Grinblatt and Hwang’s (1989) signalling argument. The relationship be -
tween initial return and downside risk awaits investigation. Initial return (underpricing) is a costly and 
difficult to imitate signal to overcome information asymmetry surrounding IPO value between firm 
insiders and outside investors. Thus, firms that underprice their IPO should exhibit superior post-
listing returns relative to those firms that do not underprice their IPO. However, the majority of 
empirical studies do not detect superior long-run return performance for underpriced IPOs. For 
10http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter  
11I have constructed all variables with a time dimension in Table III over different time frequencies to detect any 
possible horizon effect among these measures. Using alternative time horizons do not significantly change the findings and 
conclusions. 
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example, Ritter (1991), Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), and Wu and Kwok (2007) report underper-
formance of IPOs for up to three years post-offering. The findings in Gompers and Lerner (2003) 
suggest that underperformance, based on cumulative abnormal returns, disappears after five years. 
Liquidity measures listed in Panel C, Panel D, and Panel E capture the second set of independent 
variables. These three distinct categories include spread based liquidity measures, price impact based 
liquidity measures, and trading volume related liquidity measures. Spread based liquidity measures in 
Panel C include proportional quoted spread and proportional realised spread (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2000; 
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001; Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes, 2013; Huberman and Halka, 
2001; Rubia and Sanchis-Marco, 2013). Price impact based liquidity measures in Panel D quantify the 
extent to which order flow impacts on prices. These measures originate from Kyle (1985). Existing 
studies such as, for example, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Glosten and Harris (1988), and 
Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) use various alternative definitions of Kyle’s (1985) original λ 
measure. Finally, trading volume based liquidity measures in Panel E include the ratio of returns to 
trading volume (Amihud, 2002; Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes, 2013; Rubia and Sanchis-Marco, 2013) and 
the number of shares traded in relation to the number of shares outstanding (Datar, Naik, and 
Radcliffe, 1998; Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes, 2013; Rubia and Sanchis-Marco, 2013). The ratio of 
returns to trading volume is a measure of liquidity. A larger price move for a given trading volume 
suggests greater illiquidity and hence higher downside risk. 
Measures on third-party certification in Panel F capture the third set of state variables. They 
incorporate underwriter reputation, underwrityer syndicate size, and venture capital backing which 
should reduce downside risk. Underwriter reputation draws on the ranking of investment banks in 
tombstone advertisements as advocated in the studies of Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Carter and 
Manaster (1990). The number of syndicate members involved in the underwriting and distribu tion of 
shares enhances the visibility of an IPO and hence improves the aftermarket liquidity of these shares. 
Syndicate members include the lead manager, co-managers and other members involved in the 
marketing of IPOs. A dummy variable captures if pre-IPO venture capitalists retain a stake in the 
post-IPO firm. 
To assess the robustness of initial return and liquidity in explaining downside risk, I use two sets 
of control variables. Panel G includes variables to control for firm and deal characteristics; wh ile 
Panel H lists controls for contemporaneous market conditions prevalent at the IPO time. I include 
earnings, assets, and leverage as IPO value drivers to control for firm characteristics. Earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) is the proxy measure for operating cash flow 
because the latter is subject to higher annual volatility. In the long term, earnings converge to cash 
flows as argued in Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) and Aggarwal, Bhagat, and Rangan (2009). 
EBITDADum is a dummy variable coded one if a firm’s EBITDA is negative in the accounting 
period leading up to flotation. Aggarwal, Bhagat, and Rangan (2009) argue that negative earnings are 
more likely to indicate future growth opportunities rather than current profitability. In their study, 
firms with greater negative earnings have higher valuations, which would appear to be counter -
intuitive from a profitability point of view. Book value of assets during the accounting period before 
flotation are an indicator of ex ante uncertainty surrounding firm value. Assets quantify a lower 
bound of firm value. Koop and Li (2001), Hunt-McCool, Koh, and Francis (1996), and Chen, Hung, 
and Wu (2002) use book value of assets as a value driver. Leverage takes account of financial distr ess 
of IPOs at flotation. Firms with higher levels of financial distress have a greater probability of going 
bankrupt and hence should experience higher downside risk. Koop and Li (2001) report a negative 
association between leverage and firm value. Sales and firm age control for firm characteristics 
surrounding ex ante uncertainty surrounding IPO value. Firms with lower sales and shorter operating 
history should have higher ex ante uncertainty surrounding IPO value. Hunt-McCool, Koh, and 
Francis (1996), Koop and Li (2001), and Aggarwal, Bhagat, and Rangan (2009) report a positive 
relationship between sales and IPO value. Hunt-McCool, Koh, and Francis (1996) provide evidence 
of a positive association between firm age and IPO value. 
In addition, I include deal characteristics such as the fraction of equity retained by original owners in 
the post-IPO firm, the proportion of new money raised at the disposal of the IPO firm, offer price, 
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number of uses of proceeds disclosed in the flotation prospectus, presence of a lock-in agreement, and 
offer size to control for deal characteristics. Firstly, Leland and Pyle’s (1977) equity retention serves as a 
costly and difficult to imitate signal in which firm insiders convey IPO value to outside investors to 
overcome Akerlof’s (1970) adverse selection problem. Equity retained is a costly and difficult to imitate 
signal because pre-IPO owners forgo the opportunity to diversify their personal investment portfolio at 
flotation. Secondly, the fraction of primary shares in relation to total number of shares offered in an 
IPO signals future capital expenditure of a firm. Downes and Heinkel (1982) and Ritter (1984) use offer 
proceeds at the disposal of an issuer in conjunction with equity retained as a joint signal of IPO value. 
Thirdly, offer price signals the variance of a firm’s expected cash flows as advocated in Grinblatt and 
Hwang (1989). Smaller offer prices have higher variance in cash flows. Thus, smaller offer prices 
should have a positive association with downside risk. Fourthly, the number of uses of IPO proceeds 
disclosed in the flotation prospectus is a proxy measure for uncertainty surrounding firm value. This 
variable could be endogenous to the amount of proceeds and hence I control for offer size. Previous 
studies report mixed evidence of the relationship between the number of uses of proceeds and initial 
return. On the one hand, Beatty and Ritter (1986) report a positive association. On the other hand, 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) argue that the number of uses of proceeds signifies a more specific 
disclosure and hence leads to lower initial return. Fifthly, a dummy variable captures the presence of a 
lock-in agreement. Lock-in agreements prohibit pre-IPO owners from selling shares in the aftermarket 
for a specified period of time. Brav and Gompers (2003) and Arthurs et al. (2009) convey that demand 
in shares of IPOs with lock-in agreements should be high because investors have a reduced moral 
hazard problem during the time interval in which original owners cannot sell their equity stakes in the 
post-IPO firm. It is only after the lock-in period expires when the supply of shares available for trading 
increases. An increase in the supply of shares could negatively impact on stock prices as argued in 
Bradley et al. (2001) and Field and Hanka (2001). Sixthly, offer size captures the total amount of 
primary as well as secondary money raised at flotation and is an indicator of IPO risk. Smaller IPOs 
are, on average, riskier than larger issues of more established companies. Beatty and Ritter (1986), 
Ritter (1987), and Carter (1992) report a negative relationship between offer size and initial return. 
Seventhly, two dummy variables capture the demand in IPO shares via price revisions between the 
initial filing price range and the offer price as advocated in Hanley (1993). IPOs at the upper end of the 
initial price range should perform better than those priced at the lower price range. 
Finally, I include variables to capture equity market and new equity issues market activity to 
control for the downside risk of individual IPOs. The cumulative contemporaneous value-weighted 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index return and the volatility of this index takes account of equity market 
conditions at the time of flotation. Controlling for market conditions is essential because the 
dependent variables VaR and CVaR use raw returns. A dummy variable captures if an IPO obtains a 
listing on the Nasdaq. This control variable is necessary since the microstructure of this market differs 
from that of the NYSE and AMEX. An additional dummy variable identifies if offer date or first trade 
date are on a Monday. Jones (2009) report that IPOs on a Monday have, on average, greater initial 
return than those issued on other days. A further dummy variable captures the January 1997 
Nasdaq reforms to the order handling rules and subsequent decimalization. Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes 
(2013) report, on average, greater initial return for IPOs after this reform. Another dummy variable 
captures the 1999−2000 IPO bubble. Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) argue that liquidity during the 
bubble period was high, particularly in terms of volume based measures. A further two dummy 
variables take account of cycles in hot and cold average initial return in the IPO market. I follow the 
definition provided in Yung, C¸olak, and Wei (2008) to differentiate between ‘hot’, ‘cold’, and ‘normal’ 
average initial return across the sample period. Studies such as, for example, Yung, C¸olak, and Wei 
(2008), Loughran and Ritter (2004), and Brailsford, Heaney, and Shi (2004) report high 
autocorrelation in average initial return over time. 
Panel I lists twelve dummy variables capture industry sector membership based on the 
classification of Koop and Li (2001). The authors use this classification in the context of IPO and 
seasoned equity valuation to take account of different ex ante uncertainty and business risk. 
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics  
Summary statistics on downside risk, initial return, liquidity, third-party certification measures, and 
control variables are available from Table IV. 
[ Table IV ] 
My sample consists of 2,413 U.S. IPOs between 1980 and 2012 for which a minimum of 150 trading 
days and a maximum of six months of daily trading prices post-offering are available. Data availability 
for price impact based liquidity measures and spread based liquidity measures reduces the sample to 
2,409 observations and 2,286 observations, respectively. 
Mean of VaR0.95 is 5.98% and 9.74% for VaR0.99. Downside risk, measured by CVaR has a mean of 
8.42% for CVaR0.95 and 12.65% for CVaR0.99. All four downside risk measures have asymmetric, leptokurtic 
distributions. Thus, most values in the distributions are on the left of the mean, with extreme values to 
the right. In addition, these distributions have thicker tails which implies higher probabilities for extreme 
values than the normal distribution would predict. 
All remaining variables of primary interest, including initial return, liquidity, and third -party 
certification measures have skewed, leptokurtic distributions. Mean initial return raw return is 
19.61% with a median of 8.04%, confirming that IPOs are, on average, underpriced. Interestingly, 
IPOs in the first quantile of observations have market prices equal to their offer prices. The initial 
return distribution is asymmetric, right skewed and leptokurtic. All liquidity measures and third -party 
certification variables also show evidence of asymmetric, leptokurtic distributions.  
5 Impact of State Variables on Downside Risk 
Evidence on the impact of initial return, liquidity, and third-party certification measures on downside 
risk are available from Table V to Table VIII. Overall, my findings provide the first evidence that initial 
return and liquidity in the aftermarket simultaneously explain IPO downside risk, while third-party 
certification has no persistent explanatory power. These findings are robust across all estimation models 
using different specifications. 
Firstly, initial return is positive and statistically significant in explaining downside risk. Thus, 
firms with higher initial return suffer greater downside risk. This relationship casts doubt on the 
validity of signalling models in which firms use underpricing as a costly and difficult to imitate signal 
to convey IPO value to outside investors (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; 
Welch, 1989). Instead, my findings are consistent with those reported in the literature on market -
overreaction. I observe high average initial return, followed greater downside risk which is consistent 
with the literature on the long-run average return underperformance as reported in Aggarwal and 
Rivoli (1990), Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Ritter and Welch (2002).  
Secondly, liquidity of IPO shares in the aftermarket also explains downside risk. More liquid shares 
have greater downside risk. These findings are consistent across seven distinct liquidity based proxy 
measures. My findings are consistent with those studies in the non-IPO literature that examine the 
relationship between liquidity and downside risk of stocks such as Rubia and Sanchis-Marco (2013). 
Thirdly, none of the proxy measures that capture third-party certification can persistently explain 
downside risk. We therefore have to conclude that underwriter reputation, the number of underwriters 
in the underwriting syndicate, and venture-capital backing appear not to reduce the downside risk of 
IPO firms in the aftermarket. My findings are therefore consistent with those reported in Beatty and 
Welch (1996) who find no evidence in support of a certification effect by which more reputable 
underwriters should reduce the ex ante information asymmetry between issuers and outside investors. 
Fourthly, tests for endogeneity of initial return, post-issue liquidity, and third-party certification 
measures in regression models using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Wooldridge, 1995) find no evidence 
that these stochastic variables are endogenous with respect to downside risk for the cross-section of 
IPOs. Thus, instrumenting these variables is not necessary and would only reduce the efficiency of the 
estimates. Multicollinearity tests using Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) do not provide evidence of 
unstable parameter estimates which would make it problematic to assess the effect of predictor variables 
on downside risk. 
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5.1 Initial Return 
Details on positive and statistically significant relationships between initial return and downside risk 
are available from Models (1) across Table V to Table VIII. On the one hand, my findings contradict 
the signalling arguments offered by Grinblatt and Hwang (1989). They argue that issuers underprice 
their IPOs to signal high IPO value to outside investors. Thus, greater underpricing should signify 
better performance and lower downside risk. On the other hand, my findings are consistent with 
those reported elsewhere in the empirical literature. For example, Ritter (1991) reports a negative 
correlation between initial return and the three-year raw return, measured from the first aftermarket 
closing share price to the earlier of the three-year anniversary or the firm’s CRSP delisting date. 
Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) also show evidence of positive initial return followed by long-run 
negative market adjusted returns. These patterns are not unique to the US IPO market (see, for 
example, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001, for an overview of the literature). 
5.2 Liquidity 
Details on positive and statistically significant correlations between liquidity based proxy measures and 
downside risk are available from Models (2) to Models (8) across Table V to Table VIII. Although the 
existing IPO literature does not provide any direct evidence of the relationship between liquidity based 
proxy measures and downside risk, while controlling for firm and deal characteristics, my findings are 
consistent with comparable tests of liquidity and downside risk reported elsewhere in the literature. 
Firstly, spread based liquidity measures, including proportional quoted spread and proportional 
realised spread, have positive and statistically significant coefficients in Models (2) and Models (3) 
across all definitions of downside risk. Studies such as, for example, Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) 
and Booth and Chua (1996) argue that greater initial return can boost the aftermarket liquidity of 
IPOs. More to the point, Rubia and Sanchis-Marco (2013) show that market liquidity explains the tail 
of the conditional distribution of daily market returns of value portfolios. In an earlier study, Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986) report that market-observed expected return is an increasing function of the 
bid-ask spread. 
Secondly, proportional price impact based measures of liquidity, including Kyle’s (1985) propor-
tional A as well as versions adjusted for the number of shares A CN and the number of trades A CQ 
have without exception positive relationships in Models (4), Models (5), and Models (6) across all 
definitions of downside risk. Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) report partial support of a significant 
correlation between initial return and price impact based liquidity measures, but the evidence is not 
as overwhelming as that for the proportional spread based liquidity measures. 
Thirdly, volume related liquidity measures, including the average ratio of absolute returns to trad-
ing volume (Illiquidity), and the number of shares traded (Turnover) all have positive relationships in 
Models (7) and Models (8). The coefficient on Illiquidity is positive. Thus, a larger price move for a given 
trading volume suggests greater illiquidity and hence higher downside risk. Amihud (2002), Datar, 
Naik, and Radcliffe (1998), and Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) report a positive 
relationship between illiquidity and return. The positive coefficient on Turnover indicates that higher 
proportions of shares traded with respect to the number of shares outstanding creates a more liquid 
market in which prices can adjust more quickly and increases the downside risk. These findings are 
therefore consistent with those reported in existing IPO studies and the wider literature. More 
specifically, Eckbo and Norli (2005) and Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) find that high initial return 
has a negative correlation with returns for a given dollar trading volume. Brennan and Subrahmanyam 
(1996) report that required rates of return are greater for illiquid stocks. 
5.3 Third-Party Certification 
Details on the absence of third-party certification in explaining downside risk are available from Mod-
els (1) to Models (8) across across Table V to Table VIII. We have to reject third-party certification on 
the basis that underwriter reputation, size of underwriting syndicate, and venture-capital backing 
variables change their statistical significance depending on model specification or never achieve 
statistical significance in the first instance. 
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Underwriter reputation never achieves statistical significance in conjunction with initial return 
across Models (1) which tests initial return as a signal of firm value or as market overreaction in 
relation to downside risk. Models (2) to Models (8) report mixed results in relation to underwriter 
reputation and liquidity. The reputation variable changes its statistical significance depending on 
model specification or never achieves statistical significance in the first instance. On the basis of this 
inconsistency, we have to reject the validity of a third-party certification effect between underwriter 
reputation and downside risk. My findings are therefore in line with the notion reported in Beatty 
and Welch (1996) that underwriter reputation does not reduce ex ante uncertainty surrounding firm 
quality. 
Similar to underwriter reputation, the findings on the size of the underwriter syndicate also provides 
mixed results. While more models show a statistically significant relationship between the size of 
underwriter syndicate and downside risk than in terms of underwriter reputation capital, we do not 
observe consistently statistically significant coefficients. 
Venture-capital backing achieves no statistical significance in any of the regression models. We 
therefore have to conclude that the presence of venture capitalists at IPO have no impact on reducing 
the ex ante uncertainty and hence risk post-flotation. My findings are therefore consistent with the 
conclusions in Liu and Ritter (2011) and Hamao, Packer, and Ritter (2000). 
5.4 Control  Variables  
Among the control variables, we observe persistent statistically significant associations between down-
side risk and negative EBITDA, assets, fraction of primary shares in relation to total shares offered, 
lock-in agreements by original owners, contemporaneous equity market returns and volatility, Nasdaq 
IPOs, and whether an IPO occurred during the 1999−2000 bubble years. Firstly, firms with negative 
EBITDA in the accounting period leading up to flotation experience greater post-IPO downside risk 
than firms with positive earnings. A consistent positive coefficient on this dummy variable across all 
model specification is therefore perhaps more intuitive than the view expressed by Aggarwal, Bhagat, 
and Rangan (2009). They argue that negative earnings are more likely to indicate future growth 
opportunities rather than current profitability. Secondly, firms with a larger asset base have smaller 
downside risk. Thirdly, a consistent positive relationship between downside risk and the fraction of 
primary shares in relation to the total number of shares offered in an IPO may at first seem counterin-
tuitive. It would perhaps be obvious to argue that higher levels of funds at the disposal of an issuing 
firm signals confidence about shareholder wealth generation from future net present value projects. 
However, these new projects are often inherent to downside risk which may explain consistent positive 
coefficients on this variable across all model specifications. Fourthly, lock-in agreements that prohibit 
pre-IPO owners from selling shares in the aftermarket increase downside risk. It is therefore more likely 
that an increase in the supply of shares after the lock-in period expires could negatively impact on stock 
prices as argued in Bradley et al. (2001) and Field and Hanka (2001). Fifthly, downside risk diminishes 
for higher cumulative contemporaneous value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index returns and the 
lower stock market volatility. Controlling for stock market conditions is essential because downside risk 
across the models rely on raw returns. Sixthly, persistent negative coefficients on the Nasdaq dummy 
variable shows an increased downside risk for IPOs on this market. The microstructure for Nasdaq 
differs from that of the NYSE and AMEX. Seventhly, new issues during the 1999−2000 IPO bubble 
experience greater downside risk. Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) argue that liquidity during the bubble 
period was high. Eighthly, IPO firms belong to Computers, Electrical Equipment, Utilities, and Retail 
sectors explain some of the variance in downside risk. On the one hand, we can observe a positive 
relationship between downside risk and firms operating in Computers, Electrical Equipment, and Retail 
sectors. On the other hand, firms in the Utilities sector exhibit lower downside risk. All remaining 
control variables change their statistical significance depending on model specification or never achieve 
statistical significance in the first instance. I do not delete statistically insignificant control variables from 
the analysis for several reasons. The aim of the analysis is not to maximize the explanatory power of 
regression models but to assess the impact of initial return and liquidity measures on downside risk 
using an identical set of control variables. Even if these controls are not persistently statistically 
significant in my regression models, these variables are normally part 
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of the analysis in IPO research. Finally, my sample is large and hence insignificant control 
variables do not use up precious degrees of freedom. 
6 Impact of State Variables on Downside Risk at Different Quantiles 
The evidence thus far shows that both initial return and liquidity explain downside risk of post-IPO 
returns, while there is no persistent evidence in support for a third-party certification effect. In this 
section, I use quantile regressions to analyse whether the relationships between downside risk, initial 
return, liquidity, and third-party certification are representative across an entire range of values or 
whether the impact in the lower and upper distributions of the dependent variables change. It is 
possible that the covariates of independent variables could change their sensitivity at different 
quantiles of downside risk. Therefore, quantile regressions provide a more comprehensive picture of 
the relationship among variables than simple least squares regression analysis. 
My findings reveal differences on how initial return and liquidity correlate with downside risk at dif-
ferent quantiles as shown in Figure 1 to Figure 8. The coefficients of third-party certification variables 
in Figure 9 to Figure 11 reject any support for a third-party certification effect in explaining downside 
risk. Firstly, initial return covariates at different quantiles are representative of the average least 
squares coefficients. The majority of quantile covariates for initial return are inside the 90% confidence 
interval of least squares regression coefficients. Secondly, downside risk is more sensitive to liquidity at 
the upper end of the distribution without any exception. The majority of quantile covariates are outside 
the 90% confidence interval of least squares regression coefficients and statistically significant. Thirdly, 
with the exception of a few cases, the majority of quantile regression coefficients that capture third-
party certification are either statistically insignificant or outside the 90% confidence interval of least 
squares regression coefficients. This finding provides a more robust result for the rejection of a third-
party certification effect. 
6.1 Initial Return 
Figure 1 provides details of the relationship between downside risk and initial return at different 
quantiles of the dependent variable. A positive association supports the notion of market timing 
abilities and market over-reaction to overpriced IPOs, consistent with the studies of Aggarwal and 
Rivoli (1990), Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), and Ritter 
and Welch (2002). 
[ Figure 1 ] 
There are very few occasions in which quantile regression covariates fall outside the confidence 
interval of least squares regression coefficients. Graphs in the top row show the regression covariates 
at different quantiles for VaR and CVaR for confidence levels c = {0.95, 0.99}. In the vast majority, 
quantile regression covariates (continues black lines) fall inside the 90% confidence interval of least 
squares regression coefficients (dashed red lines). Grey areas indicate the 90% confidence levels of 
quantile regression coefficients at different quantiles r. Tables across the middle row show the actual 
values of the regression coefficients at various quantiles r. Tables across the middle row show the 
actual values of the regression coefficents at various quantiles r. All quantile regression coefficients are 
statistically significant across VaR and CVaR as well as their corresponding confidence levels with the 
exception of r = 0.95 for CVaR0.95, r = {0.90, 0.95} for VaR0.99, r = {0.90, 0.95} for CVaR0.95, and r = {0.85, 0.90, 
0.95} for CVaR0.99. Tables across the bottom row report tests of equality of quantile regression 
coefficients across different levels of r. F-tests across all r quantiles show statistically significant 
differences. 
6.2 Liquidity 
Figure 2 to Figure 8 show the associations between downside risk and liquidity for regression coefficients 
at different quantiles. The findings allow me to draw several conclusions. Firstly, post-issue liquidity 
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does not affect downside risk evenly across the entire distribution. Secondly, quantile regressions are 
superior at predicting the tail of the conditional distribution of downside risk. This estimation technique 
therefore offers a more complete characterization of the stochastic relationship between downside risk 
and liquidity than traditional least squares regression models. I base these conclusions on the following 
evidence. To begin with, we can observe positive correlations between downside risk and various 
definitions of post-issue liquidity at different quantiles. In addition, we can observe more sensitive 
correlations among the variables towards the upper end of the distribution of downside risk. 
Furthermore, these differences in the size of covariates between the upper part and the lower end of the 
distribution are statistically significant. Moreover, the majority of quantile regression covariates are 
outside the 90% confidence intervals of least squares regression coefficients. These findings are 
consistent across spread based liquidity measures, price impact based liquidity measures, and trading 
volume related liquidity measures. 
Firstly, Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide details on the relationship between downside risk, quoted 
spread and realised spread. 
[ Figure 2 ]  
[ Figure 3 ] 
Greater spread-based liquidity stocks experience higher downside risk, measured by post-issue IPO 
returns. Both spread-based liquidity measures consistently show statistically significant correlations 
with VaR and CVaR across confidence levels c = {0.95, 0.99}. More significantly, the vast majority of 
quantile regression covariates fall outside the 90% confidence interval of least squares coefficients. 
Downside risk in the upper end of the distribution appears to be particularly pronounced for those 
stocks with increasing liquidity. While coefficients in the lower part of the distribution have values less 
than those predicted by least squares regressions, quantile covariates in the upper end of the 
distribution of downside risk have greater sensitivity than those predicted by least squares. F-tests 
measuring differences between coefficients across all r quantiles are statistically significant. Even 
though my study is the first to make the link between spread-based liquidity and downside risk, the 
findings resemble the conclusions in other related studies such as Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and 
Rubia and Sanchis-Marco (2013). 
Secondly, Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6 show details on the association between downside risk 
and proportional price impact based liquidity measures. They are: Kyle’s A (Figure 4), Kyle’s A CN 
(Figure 5), and Kyle’s A CQ (Figure 6). Overall, we can observe that price impact based liquidity 
measures can explain downside risk, but the evidence is not as strong as for spread based liquidity 
measures. 
[ Figure 4 ] 
[ Figure 5 ] 
[ Figure 6 ] 
To begin with, not all regression covariates of Kyle’s A in Figure 4 are statistically significant at each 
quantile for VaR and CVaR. However, the majority of coefficients are outside the 90% confidence 
interval of least squares regression coefficients. Quantile covariates are statistically significant at the 
upper end of the distribution of downside risk, while at the lower end the explanatory power of Kyle’s A 
is statistically not significant. I therefore conclude that the impact and sensitivity of Kyle’s A becomes 
more prominent for those stocks with an increased downside risk. This piece of evidence helps to 
explain the marginal statistical significance of the least squares regression coefficient on Kyle’s A 
reported in Model (4) of Table V, Table VI, Table VII, and Table VIII. 
In addition, we can observe a similar pattern between Kyle’s A CN in Figure 5 and downside risk, 
particularly for CVaR. The majority of quantile regression covariates are outside the 90% confidence 
interval of least squares coefficients and gain increasing statistical significance as well as sensitivity in the 
upper end of the downside risk distribution. This effect in the case of Kyle’s A CN is not as 
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pronounced as that for Kyle’s A and hence the least squares coefficients in Model (5) of Table V, Table 
VI, Table VII, and Table VIII are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Finally, the results for Kyle’s A CQ in Figure 6 show statistically significant covariates at each 
regression quantile. The majority of quantile regression covariates are outside the 90% confidence 
interval of least squares regression coefficients. Also, the sensitivity of the impact of Kyle’s A CQ 
increases at the upper end of the downside risk distribution. F-statistics tests for pairwise equality of 
slope coefficients show that differences between upper and lower quantiles are statistically significant. 
Thirdly, Figure 7 and Figure 8 present details on the relationship between downside risk and trading 
volume related liquidity measures. 
[ Figure 7 ]  
[ Figure 8 ] 
Greater illiquidity and turnover experience higher downside risk. Both trading volume based liquidity 
measures show statistically significant correlations with VaR and CVaR. In a similar way to spread based 
and price impact based liquidity measures, the vast majority of quantile regression covariates fall outside 
the 90% confidence interval of least squares coefficients. On average, downside risk in the upper end of 
the VaR and CVaR distributions have greater sensitivity than those predicted by least squares. F-tests 
across all r quantiles show that differences in covariates are statistically significant. These findings are 
consistent with those reported in Eckbo and Norli (2005). The authors associate high trading volume 
with IPO underperformance because these stocks are more liquid than a seasoned control sample 
matched on size and book-to-market. 
6.3 Third-Party Certi f ication 
Figure 9 to Figure 11 provide details on the relationship between third-party certification and downside 
risk. I find no evidence to support a third-party certification effect on downside risk. With the exception 
of a few instances, the majority of quantile regression coefficients for underwriter reputation, the 
number of underwriters in the underwriting syndicate, and venture-capital backing measures are either 
statistically insignificant or outside the 90% confidence interval of least squares regression coefficients. 
These findings provide a more robust test of the rejection of a third-party certification effect than the 
results presented in Table V to Table VIII. 
Firstly, the majority of quantile regression coefficients for underwriter reputation are statistically 
insignificant and/or outside the 90% confidence interval of least squares regression coefficients. 
[ Figure 9 ] 
Figure 9 in conjunction with Table V to Table VIII therefore reject the notion of a third-party cer-
tification effect using a more robust test. My findings are consistent with the view held in Beatty and 
Welch (1996) and inconsistent with conclusion reported in the studies of Megginson and Weiss (1991), 
Carter and Manaster (1990), and Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) which claim that underwriter reputation 
help to reduce ex ante valuation uncertainty. 
Secondly, all quantile regression coefficients for the number of underwriters in the underwriting syn-
dicate are either statistically insignificant and/or outside the 90% confidence interval of least squares 
regression coefficients. 
[ Figure 10 ] 
Figure 10 together with Table V to Table VIII provide further evidence that there is no evidence in 
support for a third-party certification effect. 
Thirdly, none of the quantile regression coefficients for venture-capital backing is statistically sig-
nificant and/or outside the 90% confidence interval of least squares regression coefficients. 
[ Figure 11 ] 
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Figure 11 confirms the findings reported in Table V to Table VIII that there is no third-party certifi-
cation from venture capital-backed IPOs. My findings therefore corroborate earlier conclusions offered 
in the studies of Liu and Ritter (2011) and Hamao, Packer, and Ritter (2000), but contradict opposing 
views held in Arthurs et al. (2009), Barry et al. (1990), Brav and Gompers (1997), Krishnan et al. 
(2011), Lerner (1994), Megginson and Weiss (1991), and Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013). 
7 Concluding Remarks and Extensions 
This study analyses the impact of initial return, post-issue liquidity, and third-party certification on 
downside risk of IPOs. I use Extreme Value Theory (EVT) and the Peak over Threshold (POT) approach 
to calculate value-at-risk (VaR) and conditional value-at-risk (CVaR). Initial return and downside risk 
exhibit a positive association which is consistent with a market-overreaction explanation but 
contradicts the validity of IPO signalling models in which underpricing acts as a costly and difficult to 
imitate signal of firm quality. Post-issue liquidity also has a positive association with downside risk. My 
findings do not support the notion that third-party certification at flotation reduces IPO downside risk. 
While some of my findings are in agreement with certain strands of the empirical literature, a more 
robust estimation technique with supplementary control variables invalidates some of the findings 
reported in earlier studies. Therefore, my findings add to the understanding of both the conceptual and 
empirical literature. 
More specifically, my study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. To begin with, 
existing studies do not provide any evidence on the association between downside risk and initial 
return. My analysis reveals that IPOs with higher initial return have greater downside risk. These 
findings are consistent with the literature on market-overreaction (Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990; Ritter, 
1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Ritter and Welch, 2002). My findings therefore cast doubt on the 
validity of signalling models in which firms use underpricing as a costly and difficult to imitate signal 
to convey IPO value to outside investors (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; 
Welch, 1989). 
In addition, the literature offers no evidence on the relationship between downside risk and post-
issue liquidity of IPOs. I use seven distinct measures to capture various aspects of liquidity, while 
controlling for firm and deal characteristics as well as contemporaneous market conditions. Post-issue 
liquidity has a positive association with downside risk. My findings are consistent with comparable 
studies on liquidity and downside risk reported elsewhere in the non-IPO literature. Firstly, quoted 
spread and realised spread liquidity measures explain the tail conditional distribution of post-issue 
daily stock market returns. This observed impact is consistent with earlier studies (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986; Rubia and Sanchis-Marco, 2013). Secondly, price impact based liquidity measures 
also explain downside risk. Thirdly, volume related liquidity measures all have positive associations 
with all definitions of downside risk. These findings are consistent with those reported elsewhere in the 
literature (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Datar, Naik, 
and Radcliffe, 1998; Rubia and Sanchis-Marco, 2013). 
Furthermore, none of the proxy measures that capture third-party certification can persistently 
explain downside risk. I conclude that underwriter reputation, the number of underwriters in the 
underwriting syndicate, and venture-capital backing appear not to reduce the downside risk of IPOs 
in the aftermarket. These findings are similar to those reported in Beatty and Welch (1996). 
My final contribution comes from the use of quantile regressions. They help in the analysis whether 
the relationships between downside risk, initial return, and third-party certification are representative 
across an entire range of values or whether the impact in the lower and upper distributions of the 
dependent variable change. Quantile regressions therefore provide a more robust test of the relation-
ships among variables than simple least squares regression analysis. Quantile regressions allow for the 
possibility that the covariates of stochastic variables could change their sensitivity at different quantiles 
of downside risk. 
While initial return covariates at different quantiles are representative of the average least squares 
coefficients, the majority of quantile covariates are outside the confidence interval of least squares 
regression coefficients and statistically significant. Post-issue liquidity does not affect downside evenly 
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across the distribution. Downside risk is more sensitive to post-issue liquidity at the upper end of the 
distribution. Therefore, quantile regressions improve the tail predictability of downside risk because 
this method offers a more complete characterization of the stochastic relationship than traditional least 
squares regression models. Quantile regression coefficients that capture third-party certification are 
either statistically insignificant and/or outside the confidence interval of least squares regression 
coefficients. This finding provides a more robust result for the rejection of a third-part certification 
effect. 
Future research can extend the present study in several directions. More comprehensive datasets 
from different developed or less developed stock markets will help to corroborate or reject the findings 
in the present study. Extended back-testing of out-of-sample tail predictability using quantile regressions 
will help to identify the effectiveness of initial return and liquidity in forecasting downside risk for the 
purpose of portfolio management and asset allocation decisions. 
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Table I: Sample Distribution of Initial Public Offerings by Year, 1985–2012 
The sample consists of 2,413 U.S. IPOs between 1985 and 2012 with an aggregate gross proceeds of $248.7 billion, 
identified from Thomson One Banker. Sample observations exclude Real Estate Investment Trusts, American 
Depository Receipts, Master Limited Partnerships, closed-end funds, unit offers, and issues with an offer price 
smaller than $5. Column one lists the calendar year. Column two reports the number of IPOs for each calendar 
year. Column three shows the percentage of IPOs per year with respect to the total number of IPOs in the sample. 
Column four provides the aggregate IPO gross proceeds in $million per calendar year. Column five shows the 
percentage of gross proceeds per year with respect to the total gross proceeds of the sample. 
 
Year 
Number of  
IPOs 
Number of  
IPOs in % 
Gross Proceeds  
in $million 
Gross Proceeds  
in % 
1985 1 0.04 42.50 0.02 
1986 117 4.85 2, 368.62 0.95 
1987 92 3.81 3, 273.19 1.32 
1988 35 1.45 1, 233.79 0.50 
1989 26 1.08 819.89 0.33 
1990 11 0.46 613.84 0.25 
1991 73 3.03 3, 893.98 1.57 
1992 140 5.80 6, 057.57 2.44 
1993 160 6.63 7, 749.97 3.12 
1994 146 6.05 6, 143.17 2.47 
1995 175 7.25 9, 179.18 3.69 
1996 260 10.77 15, 943.79 6.41 
1997 165 6.84 8, 689.90 3.49 
1998 125 5.18 12, 393.36 4.98 
1999 174 7.21 23, 222.31 9.34 
2000 87 3.61 8, 159.08 3.28 
2001 32 1.33 3, 368.37 1.35 
2002 42 1.74 5, 755.85 2.31 
2003 33 1.37 5, 269.29 2.12 
2004 96 3.98 15, 881.41 6.39 
2005 95 3.94 15, 831.38 6.37 
2006 97 4.02 19, 593.49 7.88 
2007 84 3.48 21, 788.64 8.76 
2008 12 0.50 3, 689.99 1.48 
2009 29 1.20 9, 243.18 3.72 
2010 54 2.24 7, 983.88 3.21 
2011 39 1.62 1, 2556.52 5.05 
2012 13 0.54 17, 953.94 7.22 
Total 2, 413 100.00 248, 700.08 100.00 
2 4  
Table II: Sample Distribution of Initial Public Offerings by Industry Classification 
Column one lists the industry sector, based on Fama and French’s (1997) updated four-digit Industry Classification (SIC) 
code available from Ken French’s web site [http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french]. 
Column two reports the number of IPOs for each industry. Column three gives the percentage of the number of IPOs for each 
industry with respect to the total number of IPOs in the sample. Column four lists the aggregate gross proceeds in $million 
for each industry. Aggregate gross proceeds exclude funds from overallotment options. Column five reports the percentage of 
gross proceeds for each industry with respect to the total gross proceeds of the sample. 
 
Industry 
Number of  
IPOs 
Number of  
IPOs in % 
Proceeds in  
$million 
Proceeds in 
% 
Agriculture 6 0.25 301.01 0.12 
Aircraft 7 0.29 1, 570.58 0.63 
Apparel 33 1.37 3, 319.13 1.33 
Automobiles and Trucks 32 1.33 3, 788.56 1.52 
Banking 79 3.27 10, 368.63 4.17 
Beer & Liquor 8 0.33 279.83 0.11 
Business Services 180 7.46 14, 532.56 5.84 
Business Supplies 9 0.37 579.02 0.23 
Candy & Soda 3 0.12 232.92 0.09 
Chemicals 22 0.91 4, 280.76 1.72 
Coal 7 0.29 2, 397.70 0.96 
Communication 90 3.73 15, 529.99 6.24 
Computer Hardware 70 2.90 3, 745.04 1.51 
Computer Software 359 14.88 42, 379.70 17.04 
Construction 23 0.95 1, 000.80 0.40 
Construction Materials 27 1.12 1, 502.30 0.60 
Consumer Goods 31 1.28 1, 816.44 0.73 
Electrical Equipment 18 0.75 1, 733.03 0.70 
Electronic Equipment 142 5.88 9, 888.80 3.98 
Entertainment 39 1.62 5, 156.16 2.07 
Fabricated Products 2 0.08 224.35 0.09 
Food Products 36 1.49 3, 276.55 1.32 
Healthcare 64 2.65 3, 937.48 1.58 
Insurance 61 2.53 7, 823.71 3.15 
Machinery 61 2.53 4, 829.13 1.94 
Measuring and Control Equipment 53 2.20 2, 193.07 0.88 
Medical Equipment 89 3.69 4, 697.11 1.89 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 6 0.25 1, 483.67 0.60 
Other 25 1.04 2, 784.81 1.12 
Personal Services 33 1.37 3, 244.96 1.30 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 73 3.03 11, 996.46 4.82 
Pharmaceutical Products 127 5.26 8, 197.54 3.30 
Precious Metals 2 0.08 215.50 0.09 
Printing and Publishing 10 0.41 1, 859.32 0.75 
Real Estate 10 0.41 568.25 0.23 
Recreation 24 0.99 924.02 0.37 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 50 2.07 4, 298.20 1.73 
Retail 197 8.16 13, 677.14 5.50 
Rubber and Plastic Products 20 0.83 944.43 0.38 
Shipbuilding and Railroad Equipment 6 0.25 483.00 0.19 
Shipping Containers 5 0.21 718.03 0.29 
Steel Works etc. 35 1.45 3, 654.55 1.47 
Textiles 15 0.62 593.60 0.24 
Tobacco Products 3 0.12 290.80 0.12 
Trading 53 2.20 18, 744.00 7.54 
Transportation 58 2.40 8, 345.70 3.36 
Utilities 17 0.70 8, 029.65 3.23 
Wholesale 93 3.85 6, 262.09 2.52 
Total 2, 413 100.00 248, 700.08 100.00 
X  1 2 ×|P− ((Ask  
B id  ) / 2 ) |   
Realised Spread=   ____________________________________________________ (7) D 
(Ask  Bid )/2 
   =1
Table III: Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Column one reports variable labels. Column two provides details on the definition and measurement of variables. 
Thomson refers to the New Issues database in Thomson One Banker. Compustat refers to Standard and Poor’s 
database and provides financial statement data. CRSP denotes the Center for Research in Security Prices and provides 
stock market data. Ritter refers to Jay Ritter’s web site [http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter]  which provides 
information on underwriter tombstone rankings which is the proxy measure for reputation. Panel A lists variables on 
downside risk. Panel B provides the definition on initial return. Panel C reports spread based liquidity measures. Panel D 
shows price impact based liquidity measures. Panel E provides trading volume related liquidity measures. Panel F 
includes third-party certification variables. Panel G lists variables on ex-ante uncertainty surrounding an IPO and 
corresponding deal characteristics. Panel H provides variables on stock market conditions. Panel I lists Koop and Li’s 
(2001) industry sector classification. 
Variable Definition and data sources 
P a n e l  A  
VaR Value-at-risk is the maximum loss of stock i over period m that can occur at confidence level 
c = {0.95, 0.99}. Confidence levels reflect those used by RiskMetrics (c = 95%) and Basel 
Accords (c = 99%). Daily stock returns for a minimum period of m = 150 days and a 
maximum period of m = 6 months are from CRSP. Section 3 provides more details on the 
calculations. 
CVaR  Conditional value-at-risk is the loss beyond the VaR threshold of an individual stock at confidence  
level c = {0.95, 0.99}. Confidence levels reflect those used by RiskMetrics (c = 95%) and Basel 
Accords (c = 99%). Daily stock returns for a minimum period of m = 150 days and a maximum period 
of m = 6 months are from CRSP. Section 3 provides more details on the calculations. 
P a n e l  B  
InitRtn Initial return: InitRtn = P/OP− 1, where P is the closing price of stock i at the end of the 
first day of trading from CRSP, and OP is the offer price from Thomson. 
P a n e l  C  
QuotedSp Average proportional quoted spread is the difference between the closing quoted ask price and 
the quoted bid price divided by the quote midpoint price:  
1 Ask− 
Quoted Spread= ___ E 
(6) 
D (AskBid)/2 
  = 1 
where D is the total number of days d for which trading data are available for stock i over a 
period of m = 6 months post-IPO, Ask is the closing ask quote, Bid is the closing bid 
quote. Bid and ask price data are available from CRSP. 
RealSp  Average proportional realised spread is twice the absolute value of the difference between the  
most recent transaction price (i.e. the closing price) and the quote midpoint prevailing after the trade 
divided 
by the 
quote 
midpoint 
price: 
where D is the total number of days d for which trading data are available for stock i over a period of m = 6 months 
post-IPO, Ask is the closing ask quote, Bid is the closing bid quote. Price data are available from CRSP. 
Pa n e l  D  
Kyle λ Kyle’s (1985) proportional λ measures the extent to which order flow impacts on prices:  
Kyle’s λ= 
0.5 × (σ2/Σ)−05 
(8) 
P 
where σ2 is the variance of daily trading volume, Σ is the variance of daily closing 
prices, and P is the mean closing price of stock i over period m = 6 months after the 
offering. Trading volume and price data are available from CRSP. 
Kyle λ CN Kyle’s (1985) proportional λ adjusted for the number of shares outstanding: 
CN= λ× N (9) 
where λ is Kyle’s (1985) proportional measure of liquidity and N is the mean number of 
shares outstanding for stock i over period m = 6 months. Number of shares outstanding and 
price data are available from CRSP. 
Kyle λ CQ Kyle’s (1985) proportional λ adjusted for the number of trades: 
CQ= λ× Q (10) 
where λ is Kyle’s (1985) proportional measure of liquidity and Q is the mean number of 
shares traded for stock i over period m = 6 months. Number of shares traded and price data 
are available from CRSP. 
2 5  
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Illiquidity Average ratio of absolute daily returns to the (dollar) trading volume on that day: 

Table III — Continued 
Variable Definition and data sources 
Panel  E 
1   X  
| r      |  Illiq= (11) 
D V OLD 
=1
where D is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in period m = 6 months, 
ris the return on stock and V OLDis the respective daily trading volume in dollars. Return 
data and trading volume are available from CRSP. 
Turnover Average number of shares traded daily: 
 
Turnover=  1  , Q (12) 
D N 
=1 
where D is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in period m = 6 
months, Qis the number of shares traded, Nis the respective number of shares 
outstanding. Data on Q and N are available from CRSP. 
Panel  F  
UwRank Average underwriter reputation rank is the Loughran and Ritter (2004) update of the Carter 
and Manaster (1990) measures ranging from zero for lowest quality to 9.1 for highest 
quality underwriters and is available from Ritter. 
NumUw  Number of underwriters in a syndicate, including lead manager, co-managers and 
members of the  
syndicate that are involved in the distribution and sales of IPO sales. Data are available 
from Thomson. 
VC-backed  Dummy variable coded one if pre-IPO venture capitalists retain a stake in the post-IPO 
firm, else  
coded zero. Thomson discloses if an IPO has VC-backing. 
Panel  G 
EBITDA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization in $million in the accounting period 
before flotation available from Thomson. Compustat is the secondary data source for those 
observations with missing values in Thomson. 
EBITDA Dum Dummy variable, coded one if EBITDA is negative in the accounting period before flotation. 
Assets Total assets at book value in $million in the accounting period before flotation available from 
Compustat. 
Leverage Long-term debt divided by total assets at book value in the accounting period before flotation  
available from Compustat. 
Sales Sales in $million for the last full fiscal year prior to flotation available from Thomson. Compustat  
is the secondary data source for those observations with missing values in Thomson. 
Age Age of firm in years between foundation date and date of flotation available from Ritter.  
Compustat is the secondary data source for those observations with missing values from Ritter. 
bα Leland and Pyle’s (1977) signal of equity retained: αb = EqRet + log(1 − EqRet), where EqRet is  
the proportion of equity retained by pre-IPO shareholders in the post-IPO firm available from 
Thomson. 
Omega Fraction of primary shares in relation to total shares offered in IPO available from Thomson. 
OfferPrice Offer (subscription) price per share in $ is available from Thomson. 
Use Number of uses of IPO proceeds disclosed in the prospectus available from Thomson. 
Lock-in Dummy variable coded one if the prospectus discloses a ‘lock-in’ agreement, else coded zero. 
Thomson indicates the presence of a lock-in agreement. 
Offer size Amount of primary plus secondary money raised in $million available from Thomson. 
AboDum Dummy variable coded one if the final offer price is above the initial filing price range, else coded 
zero. Data on filing price ranges are available from Thomson. 
BelDum Dummy variable coded one if the final offer price is below the initial filing price range, else coded  
zero. Data on filing price ranges are available from Thomson. 
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Table III — Continued 
Variable Definition and data sources 
Panel H 
MktRet Cumulative contemporaneous value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index covers a maximum of 
six months post-offering for which data are available from CRSP. 
MktRisk Variance of the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index covers a maximum of six months 
post-offering for which data are available from CRSP. 
Nasdaq Dummy variable coded one if a firm lists IPO to trade on Nasdaq, else coded zero. Details on 
stock markets are available from Thomson. 
Monday Dummy variable coded one if the offering and first aftermarket trade is on a Monday, else coded 
zero. Dates are available from Thomson and CRSP. 
Nasdaq Ref Dummy variable coded one if an IPO occurs after January 1, 1997 to capture the Nasdaq reform 
in the order handling rules and subsequent decimalization, else coded zero. Dates are 
available from Thomson and CRSP. 
MktBubble Dummy variable coded one to capture the 1999−2000 IPO bubble years, else coded zero. 
Dates are available from Thomson and CRSP. 
HotMkt Dummy variable coded one if the average initial return in a quarter is 50% greater than the three- 
monthly moving average, else coded zero. Aggregate IPO data are available from Ritter. 
ColdMkt Dummy variable coded one if the average initial return in a quarter is 50% smaller than the three- 
monthly moving average, else coded zero. Aggregate IPO data are available from Ritter. 
Panel  I  
OilGas Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the oil and gas industry sector, else coded zero. 
Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC available 
from Thomson. 
ChemProd Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the chemical products industry sector, else 
coded zero. Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on 
SIC available from Thomson. 
Manuf Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the manufacturing industry sector, else coded 
zero. Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC 
available from Thomson. 
Computers Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the computers industry sector, else coded zero. 
Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC available 
from Thomson. 
ElectEq Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the electronic equipment industry sector, else 
coded zero. Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on 
SIC available from Thomson. 
Transp Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the transportation industry sector, else coded 
zero. Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC 
available from Thomson. 
ScientifInst Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the scientific instruments industry sector, else 
coded zero. Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on 
SIC available from Thomson. 
Communic Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the communication industry sector, else coded 
zero. Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC 
available from Thomson. 
Utilities Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the utilities industry sector, else coded zero. 
Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC available 
from Thomson. 
Retail Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the retail industry sector, else coded zero. 
Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC available 
from Thomson. 
FinServ Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the financial services industry sector, else coded 
zero. Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC 
available from Thomson. 
Health Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the health industry sector, else coded zero. 
Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC available 
from Thomson. 
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g
 a
n
d
 c
lo
s
in
g
 p
ri
c
e
s
. 
K
y
le
 λ
 C
Q
 i
s
 K
y
le
’s
 (
1
9
8
5
) 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
a
l 
λ
 a
d
ju
s
te
d
 
fo
r 
th
e
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
tr
a
d
e
s
 a
n
d
 c
lo
s
in
g
 p
ri
c
e
s
. 
Il
li
q
u
id
it
y
 i
s
 t
h
e
 a
v
e
ra
g
e
 r
a
ti
o
 o
f 
a
b
s
o
lu
te
 d
a
il
y
 r
e
tu
rn
s
 t
o
 t
ra
d
in
g
 v
o
lu
m
e
. 
T
u
rn
o
v
e
r 
is
 t
h
e
 a
v
e
ra
g
e
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
s
h
a
re
s
 t
ra
d
e
d
. 
U
w
R
a
n
k
 
m
e
a
s
u
re
s
 u
n
d
e
rw
ri
te
r 
re
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
. 
N
u
m
U
w
 i
s
 t
h
e
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
u
n
d
e
rw
ri
te
rs
 i
n
 t
h
e
 I
P
O
. 
V
 C
 −
 b
a
c
k
e
d
 i
n
d
ic
a
te
s
 v
e
n
tu
re
 c
a
p
it
a
l 
b
a
c
k
e
d
 I
P
O
. 
E
B
IT
D
A
 a
re
 e
a
rn
in
g
s
 b
e
fo
re
 i
n
te
re
s
t,
 t
a
x
, 
d
e
p
re
c
ia
ti
o
n
, 
a
n
d
 a
m
o
rt
iz
a
ti
o
n
. 
E
B
IT
D
A
D
u
m
 i
s
 a
 d
u
m
m
y
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
, 
c
o
d
e
d
 o
n
e
 i
f 
E
B
IT
D
A
 i
s
 n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
. 
A
s
s
e
ts
 a
re
 a
s
s
e
ts
 a
t 
b
o
o
k
 v
a
lu
e
. 
L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
 i
s
 l
o
n
g
-t
e
rm
 d
e
b
t 
d
iv
id
e
d
 b
y
 t
o
ta
l 
a
s
s
e
ts
. 
S
a
le
s
 i
s
 a
n
n
u
a
l 
s
a
le
s
. 
A
g
e
 i
s
 f
ir
m
 a
g
e
. 
α
ˆ 
is
 L
e
la
n
d
 a
n
d
 P
y
le
’s
 (
1
9
7
7
) 
s
ig
n
a
l 
o
f 
e
q
u
it
y
 r
e
ta
in
e
d
. 
O
m
e
g
a
 i
s
 t
h
e
 f
ra
c
ti
o
n
 o
f 
p
ri
m
a
ry
 s
h
a
re
s
 o
ff
e
re
d
. 
O
ff
e
rP
ri
c
e
 i
s
 t
h
e
 o
ff
e
r 
p
ri
c
e
. 
U
s
e
 i
s
 t
h
e
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
u
s
e
s
 o
f 
p
ro
c
e
e
d
s
. 
L
o
c
k
 −
 i
n
 i
n
d
ic
a
te
s
 t
h
e
 p
re
s
e
n
c
e
 o
f 
a
 l
o
c
k
-i
n
 p
e
ri
o
d
. 
O
ff
e
rS
iz
e
 i
s
 t
h
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
p
ri
m
a
ry
 a
n
d
 s
e
c
o
n
d
a
ry
 m
o
n
e
y
 r
a
is
e
d
. 
A
b
o
D
u
m
 i
n
d
ic
a
te
s
 i
f 
O
ff
e
rP
ri
c
e
 i
s
 a
b
o
v
e
 t
h
e
 i
n
it
ia
l 
fi
li
n
g
 p
ri
c
e
 r
a
n
g
e
. 
B
e
lD
u
m
 i
n
d
ic
a
te
s
 i
f 
O
ff
e
rP
ri
c
e
 i
s
 b
e
lo
w
 t
h
e
 i
n
it
ia
l 
fi
li
n
g
 p
ri
c
e
 r
a
n
g
e
. 
M
k
tR
e
t 
is
 t
h
e
 c
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
 N
Y
S
E
/
A
M
E
X
/
N
a
s
d
a
q
 i
n
d
e
x
 r
e
tu
rn
. 
M
k
tR
is
k
 i
s
 t
h
e
 v
a
ri
a
n
c
e
 o
f 
M
k
tR
e
t.
 N
a
s
d
a
q
 i
n
d
ic
a
te
s
 i
f 
a
n
 I
P
O
 i
s
 a
 N
a
s
d
a
q
 i
s
s
u
e
. 
M
o
n
d
a
y
 i
n
d
ic
a
te
s
 i
f 
a
n
 I
P
O
 i
s
 i
s
s
u
e
d
 o
r 
s
ta
rt
e
d
 t
ra
d
in
g
 o
n
 a
 M
o
n
d
a
y
. 
N
a
s
d
a
q
R
e
f 
in
d
ic
a
te
s
 i
f 
a
n
 
IP
O
 i
s
 i
s
s
u
e
d
 a
ft
e
r 
J
a
n
u
a
ry
 1
9
9
7
. 
M
k
tB
u
b
b
le
 i
n
d
ic
a
te
s
 i
f 
a
n
 I
P
O
 i
s
 i
s
s
u
e
d
 d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
e
 b
u
b
b
le
 p
e
ri
o
d
. 
H
o
tM
k
t 
in
d
ic
a
te
s
 i
f 
a
n
 I
P
O
 i
s
 i
s
s
u
e
d
 d
u
ri
n
g
 a
 h
o
t 
n
e
w
 i
s
s
u
e
 p
e
ri
o
d
. 
C
o
ld
M
k
t 
in
d
ic
a
te
s
 i
f 
a
n
 I
P
O
 i
s
 i
s
s
u
e
d
 d
u
ri
n
g
 a
 c
o
ld
 n
e
w
 i
s
s
u
e
 p
e
ri
o
d
. 
In
d
u
s
tr
y
 s
e
c
to
r 
d
u
m
m
y
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 c
a
p
tu
re
 d
if
fe
re
n
c
e
s
 i
n
 t
h
e
 c
o
s
t
 o
f 
c
a
p
it
a
l 
a
n
d
 b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 r
is
k
 a
c
ro
s
s
 i
n
d
u
s
tr
y
 s
e
c
to
rs
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
K
o
o
p
 
a
n
d
 
L
i’
s
 
(2
0
0
1
) 
1
2
-i
n
d
u
s
tr
y
 
s
e
c
to
r 
c
la
s
s
if
ic
a
ti
o
n
: 
O
il
G
a
s
 
is
 
o
il
 
a
n
d
 
g
a
s
, 
C
h
e
m
P
ro
d
 
is
 
c
h
e
m
ic
a
l 
p
ro
d
u
c
ts
, 
M
a
n
u
f 
is
 
m
a
n
u
fa
c
tu
ri
n
g
, 
C
o
m
p
u
te
rs
 
is
 
c
o
m
p
u
te
rs
, 
E
le
c
tE
q
 i
s
 e
le
c
tr
o
n
ic
 e
q
u
ip
m
e
n
t,
 T
ra
n
s
p
 i
s
 t
ra
n
s
p
o
rt
a
ti
o
n
, 
S
c
ie
n
ti
fI
n
s
t 
is
 s
c
ie
n
ti
fi
c
 i
n
s
tr
u
m
e
n
ts
, 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
 i
s
 c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
, 
U
ti
li
ti
e
s
 i
s
 u
ti
li
ti
e
s
, 
R
e
ta
il
 i
s
 r
e
ta
il
, 
F
in
S
e
rv
 i
s
 
fi
n
a
n
c
ia
l 
s
e
rv
ic
e
s
, 
H
e
a
lt
h
 i
s
 h
e
a
lt
h
. 
D
e
ta
il
s
 o
n
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
 d
e
fi
n
it
io
n
s
 a
re
 a
v
a
il
a
b
le
 f
ro
m
 T
a
b
le
 I
II
. 
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T
a
b
le
 I
V
 —
 C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
 
A
b
o
D
u
m
 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.1
7
7
4
 
0
 
0
.3
8
2
1
 
1
.6
9
1
3
 
3
.8
6
1
5
 
B
e
lD
u
m
 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.1
7
2
0
 
0
 
0
.3
7
7
4
 
1
.7
4
0
6
 
4
.0
3
0
5
 
M
k
tR
tn
 
2
,4
1
3
 
0
.0
1
6
6
 
0
.0
6
7
0
 
0
.0
5
8
5
 
0
.1
1
4
3
 
0
.0
8
8
3
 
−
0
.9
0
3
1
 
5
.1
4
7
3
 
M
k
tR
is
k
 
2
,4
1
3
 
M
k
tR
is
k
×
1
0
 
0
.0
3
7
9
 
0
.0
5
7
0
 
0
.1
0
0
5
 
0
.1
2
5
2
 
0
.1
1
2
1
 
3
.2
1
1
0
 
1
8
.3
7
7
1
 
N
a
s
d
a
q
 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
1
 
1
 
0
.7
7
2
5
 
1
 
0
.4
1
9
3
 
−
1
.3
0
1
5
 
2
.6
9
5
4
 
M
o
n
d
a
y
 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.0
9
5
3
 
0
 
0
.2
9
3
7
 
2
.7
5
9
6
 
8
.6
1
4
5
 
N
a
s
d
a
q
R
e
f 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.4
8
4
9
 
1
 
0
.4
9
9
9
 
0
.0
6
0
6
 
1
.0
0
5
7
 
M
k
tB
u
b
b
le
 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.1
0
8
2
 
0
 
0
.3
1
0
7
 
2
.5
2
6
3
 
7
.3
8
1
8
 
H
o
tM
k
t 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.0
4
3
1
 
0
 
0
.2
0
3
1
 
4
.5
0
5
3
 
2
1
.2
9
1
1
 
C
o
ld
M
k
t 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.0
1
9
9
 
0
 
0
.1
3
9
7
 
6
.8
8
5
4
 
4
8
.3
9
1
3
 
O
il
G
a
s
 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.0
3
0
3
 
0
 
0
.1
7
1
3
 
5
.4
9
1
9
 
3
1
.1
5
0
5
 
C
h
e
m
P
ro
d
 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.0
6
3
4
 
0
 
0
.2
4
3
7
 
3
.5
8
7
6
 
1
3
.8
6
7
7
 
M
a
n
u
fa
c
t 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.0
3
5
2
 
0
 
0
.1
8
4
4
 
5
.0
4
8
6
 
2
6
.4
7
9
6
 
C
o
m
p
u
te
rs
 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.2
4
4
5
 
0
 
0
.4
2
9
9
 
1
.1
9
0
4
 
2
.4
1
8
5
 
E
le
c
tE
q
 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.0
7
1
7
 
0
 
0
.2
5
8
0
 
3
.3
2
4
6
 
1
2
.0
5
0
2
 
T
ra
n
s
p
 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.0
4
7
7
 
0
 
0
.2
1
3
1
 
4
.2
5
1
8
 
1
9
.0
7
2
1
 
S
c
ie
n
ti
fI
n
s
t 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.0
6
2
2
 
0
 
0
.2
4
1
5
 
3
.6
3
1
2
 
1
4
.1
8
2
3
 
C
o
m
u
n
ic
 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.0
3
7
3
 
0
 
0
.1
8
9
5
 
4
.8
8
9
7
 
2
4
.9
0
1
4
 
U
ti
li
ti
e
s
 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.0
1
7
4
 
0
 
0
.1
3
0
8
 
7
.3
8
9
6
 
5
5
.5
8
5
2
 
R
e
ta
il
 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.0
6
8
8
 
0
 
0
.2
5
3
2
 
3
.4
1
1
6
 
1
2
.6
3
6
2
 
F
in
S
e
rv
 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.0
8
4
1
 
0
 
0
.2
7
7
6
 
3
.0
0
0
2
 
9
.9
9
9
3
 
H
e
a
lt
h
 
2
,4
1
3
 
Z
e
ro
-o
n
e
 d
u
m
m
y
 
0
 
0
 
0
.0
2
6
5
 
0
 
0
.1
6
0
7
 
5
.9
0
0
6
 
3
5
.8
0
4
5
 
Variable 
Observations 
Unit 
1st Quartile 
Median 
Mean 
3rd Quartile 
Std. Dev. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
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V
aR
0.9
5 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
In
it
R
tn
 
0
.0
0
6
5
**
*  
(0
.0
01
2)
 
Q
u
o
te
d
S
p
 
0
.5
4
7
5
**
*  
(0
.0
51
3)
 
R
ea
lS
p
 
0
.9
4
5
8
**
*  
(0
.0
37
2)
 
K
yl
e 
λ 
0
.0
0
0
7
*  
(0
.0
00
4)
 
K
yl
e 
λ 
C
N
 
0
.0
0
0
3
**
*  
(0.0001) 
K
yl
e 
λ 
C
Q
 
0
.1
7
6
6
**
*  
(0.0110) 
Il
liq
u
id
it
y 
0
.0
0
3
0
**
*  
(0.0005) 
T
u
rn
o
v
er
 
0
.4
2
1
4
**
*  
(0
.0
85
4)
 
U
w
R
an
k
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
 
0
.0
0
0
3
 
0
.0
0
0
4
*  
−
0
.0
0
0
4
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
*  
−
0
.0
0
0
6
**
 
−
0
.0
0
0
2
 
−
0
.0
0
0
4
 
(0
.0
0
0
3
) 
(0
.0
0
0
3
) 
(0
.0
0
0
2
) 
(0
.0
0
0
3
) 
(0
.0
0
0
3
) 
(0
.0
0
0
3
) 
(0
.0
0
0
3
) 
(0
.0
0
0
3
) 
N
u
m
U
w
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
 
−
0
.0
0
1
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
0
6
 
−
0
.0
0
0
2
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
 
−
0
.0
0
0
9
 
−
0
.0
0
0
8
 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
V
C
-b
ac
k
ed
 
0
.0
0
0
5
 
0
.0
0
0
4
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
0
.0
0
0
3
 
0
.0
0
0
2
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 
0
.0
0
0
4
 
0
.0
0
1
0
 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
lo
g(
E
B
IT
D
A
) 
−
0
.0
0
0
9
*  
−
0
.0
0
1
6
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
1
0
*  
−
0
.0
0
1
0
*  
−
0
.0
0
0
5
 
−
0
.0
0
1
3
**
 
−
0
.0
0
1
0
*  
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
E
B
IT
D
A
D
u
m
 
0
.0
1
5
8
**
*  
0
.0
1
9
7
**
*  
0
.0
2
2
1
**
*  
0
.0
1
6
5
**
*  
0
.0
1
6
3
**
*  
0
.0
1
0
7
**
*  
0
.0
1
8
2
**
*  
0
.0
1
6
8
**
*  
(0
.0
0
3
8
) 
(0
.0
0
3
8
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
4
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
9
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
9
) 
(0
.0
0
3
9
) 
lo
g(
A
ss
et
s)
 
−
0
.0
0
2
8
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
7
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
5
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
3
1
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
3
3
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
6
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
3
1
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
5
**
*  
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
lo
g(
L
ev
er
ag
e)
 
−
0
.0
0
0
3
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
**
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
**
 
−
0
.0
0
0
4
 
−
0
.0
0
0
4
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
**
 
−
0
.0
0
0
2
 
(0
.0
0
0
3
) 
(0
.0
0
0
2
) 
(0
.0
0
0
2
) 
(0
.0
0
0
3
) 
(0
.0
0
0
3
) 
(0
.0
0
0
2
) 
(0
.0
0
0
3
) 
(0
.0
0
0
3
) 
T
a
b
le
 V
: 
In
it
ia
l 
R
e
tu
rn
, 
L
iq
u
id
it
y
 a
n
d
 V
a
u
le
-a
t-
R
is
k
 f
o
r 
C
o
n
fi
d
e
n
c
e
 L
e
v
e
l 
c 
=
 0
.9
5
 
V
 a
R
 i
s 
th
e 
v
al
u
e-
at
-r
is
k
 f
o
r 
co
n
fi
d
en
ce
 l
ev
el
 c
 =
 0
.9
5
. 
In
it
R
tn
 i
s 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
 a
ft
er
 t
h
e 
fi
rs
t 
d
ay
 o
f 
tr
ad
in
g.
 Q
u
o
te
d
S
p
 i
s 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 q
u
o
te
d
 s
p
re
ad
. 
R
e
a
lS
p
 i
s 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 r
ea
li
se
d
 s
p
re
ad
. 
K
yl
e 
λ 
is
 K
yl
e’
s 
(1
9
8
5
) 
m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
th
e 
ex
te
n
t 
to
 w
h
ic
h
 o
rd
er
 f
lo
w
 i
m
p
ac
ts
 o
n
 p
ri
ce
s.
 K
yl
e 
λ 
C
N
 i
s 
K
yl
e’
s 
(1
9
8
5
) 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 λ
 a
d
ju
st
ed
 f
o
r 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 
o
f 
sh
ar
es
 o
u
ts
ta
n
d
in
g
 a
n
d
 c
lo
si
n
g
 p
ri
ce
s.
 K
yl
e 
λ 
C
Q
 i
s 
K
yl
e’
s 
(1
9
8
5
) 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 λ
 a
d
ju
st
ed
 f
o
r 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
tr
ad
es
 a
n
d
 c
lo
si
n
g
 p
ri
ce
s.
 I
ll
iq
u
id
it
y
 i
s 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
ab
so
lu
te
 
d
ai
ly
 r
et
u
rn
s 
to
 t
ra
d
in
g 
v
o
lu
m
e.
 T
u
rn
o
v
e
r 
is
 t
h
e 
av
er
ag
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
sh
ar
es
 t
ra
d
ed
. 
U
w
R
a
n
k
 m
ea
su
re
s 
u
n
d
er
w
ri
te
r 
re
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
. 
N
u
m
U
w
 i
s 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
u
n
d
er
w
ri
te
rs
 i
n
 t
h
e 
IP
O
. 
V
 C
 
−
 b
a
c
k
e
d
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 v
en
tu
re
 c
ap
it
al
 b
ac
k
ed
 I
P
O
. 
E
B
IT
D
A
 a
re
 e
ar
n
in
g
s 
b
ef
o
re
 i
n
te
re
st
, 
ta
x
, 
d
ep
re
ci
at
io
n
, 
an
d
 a
m
o
rt
iz
at
io
n
. 
E
B
IT
D
A
D
u
m
 i
s 
a 
d
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
b
le
, 
co
d
ed
 o
n
e 
if
 E
B
IT
D
A
 
is
 n
eg
at
iv
e.
 A
ss
e
ts
 a
re
 a
ss
et
s 
at
 b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e.
 L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
 i
s 
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
 d
eb
t 
d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
. 
S
a
le
s 
is
 a
n
n
u
al
 s
al
es
. 
A
g
e
 i
s 
fi
rm
 a
ge
. 
α
ˆ 
is
 L
el
an
d
 a
n
d
 P
yl
e’
s 
(1
9
7
7
) 
si
g
n
al
 o
f 
eq
u
it
y 
re
ta
in
ed
. 
O
m
e
g
a
 i
s 
th
e 
fr
ac
ti
o
n
 o
f 
p
ri
m
ar
y 
sh
ar
es
 o
ff
er
ed
. 
O
ff
e
rP
ri
c
e
 i
s 
th
e 
o
ff
er
 p
ri
ce
. 
U
se
 i
s 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
u
se
s 
o
f 
p
ro
ce
ed
s.
 L
o
c
k
 −
 i
n
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 t
h
e 
p
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
a 
lo
ck
-i
n
 p
er
io
d
. 
O
ff
e
rS
iz
e
 i
s 
th
e 
am
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
p
ri
m
ar
y 
an
d
 s
ec
o
n
d
ar
y 
m
o
n
ey
 r
ai
se
d
. 
A
b
o
D
u
m
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
O
ff
e
rP
ri
c
e
 i
s 
ab
o
v
e 
th
e 
in
it
ia
l 
fi
li
n
g 
p
ri
ce
 r
an
ge
. 
B
e
lD
u
m
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
O
ff
e
rP
ri
c
e
 i
s 
b
el
o
w
 t
h
e 
in
it
ia
l 
fi
li
n
g 
p
ri
ce
 r
an
ge
. 
M
k
tR
e
t 
is
 t
h
e 
cu
m
u
la
ti
v
e 
N
Y
S
E
/
A
M
E
X
/
N
as
d
aq
 i
n
d
ex
 r
et
u
rn
. 
M
k
tR
is
k
 i
s 
th
e 
v
ar
ia
n
ce
 o
f 
M
k
tR
e
t.
 N
a
sd
a
q
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
a 
N
as
d
aq
 i
ss
u
e.
 M
o
n
d
a
y 
in
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 o
r 
st
ar
te
d
 t
ra
d
in
g 
o
n
 a
 M
o
n
d
ay
. 
N
a
sd
a
q
R
e
f 
in
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 a
ft
er
 J
an
u
ar
y 
1
9
9
7
. 
M
k
tB
u
b
b
le
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
th
e 
b
u
b
b
le
 
p
er
io
d
. 
H
o
tM
k
t 
in
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
a 
h
o
t 
n
ew
 i
ss
u
e 
p
er
io
d
. 
C
o
ld
M
k
t 
in
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
a 
co
ld
 n
ew
 i
ss
u
e 
p
er
io
d
. 
In
d
u
st
ry
 s
ec
to
r 
d
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
ca
p
tu
re
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
in
 t
h
e 
co
st
 o
f 
ca
p
it
al
 a
n
d
 b
u
si
n
es
s 
ri
sk
 a
cr
o
ss
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
 s
ec
to
rs
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 K
o
o
p
 a
n
d
 L
i’
s 
(2
0
0
1
) 
1
2
-i
n
d
u
st
ry
 s
ec
to
r 
cl
as
si
fi
ca
ti
o
n
: 
O
il
G
a
s 
is
 o
il
 a
n
d
 g
as
, 
C
h
e
m
P
ro
d
 i
s 
ch
em
ic
al
 p
ro
d
u
ct
s,
 M
a
n
u
f 
is
 m
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g,
 C
o
m
p
u
te
rs
 i
s 
co
m
p
u
te
rs
, 
E
le
c
tE
q
 i
s 
el
ec
tr
o
n
ic
 e
q
u
ip
m
en
t,
 T
ra
n
sp
 i
s 
tr
an
sp
o
rt
at
io
n
, 
S
c
ie
n
ti
fI
n
st
 i
s 
sc
ie
n
ti
fi
c 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
, 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
 i
s 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
, 
U
ti
li
ti
e
s 
is
 u
ti
li
ti
es
, 
R
e
ta
il
 i
s 
re
ta
il
, 
F
in
S
e
rv
 i
s 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 s
er
v
ic
es
, 
H
e
a
lt
h
 i
s 
h
ea
lt
h
. 
D
et
ai
ls
 o
n
 v
ar
ia
b
le
 d
ef
in
it
io
n
s 
ar
e 
av
ai
la
b
le
 f
ro
m
 T
ab
le
 I
II
. 
**
*,
 *
*,
 *
 d
en
o
te
 1
%
, 
5
%
, 
an
d
 1
0
%
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
, 
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
 
30 
 
V
aR
0.9
5 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
T
a
b
le
 V
 —
 C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
 
α
ˆ 
−
0
.0
0
4
3
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
7
1
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
7
2
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
5
4
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
7
**
 
−
0
.0
0
2
6
**
 
−
0
.0
0
5
4
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
5
6
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
O
m
eg
a 
0
.0
0
5
9
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
2
**
*  
0
.0
0
6
2
**
*  
0
.0
0
6
1
**
*  
0
.0
0
6
1
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
1
**
*  
0
.0
0
6
5
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
7
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
lo
g(
O
ff
er
P
ri
ce
) 
−
0
.0
1
0
5
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
5
3
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
4
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
9
6
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
8
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
8
3
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
8
5
**
*  
−
0
.0
1
0
4
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
lo
g(
1
+
U
se
) 
−
0
.0
0
3
6
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
1
5
 
−
0
.0
0
1
7
*  
−
0
.0
0
4
2
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
4
3
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
3
6
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
4
2
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
3
5
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
L
o
ck
-i
n
 
0
.0
0
5
1
**
*  
0
.0
0
3
8
**
*  
0
.0
0
3
6
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
1
**
*  
0
.0
0
4
7
**
*  
0
.0
0
3
6
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
5
**
*  
0
.0
0
4
5
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
lo
g(
O
ff
er
S
iz
e)
 
0
.0
0
3
7
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
4
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
3
**
*  
0
.0
0
4
7
**
*  
0
.0
0
4
2
**
*  
0
.0
0
2
2
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
4
**
*  
0
.0
0
2
9
**
*  
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
7
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
A
b
o
D
u
m
 
0
.0
0
2
1
**
 
0
.0
0
3
9
**
*  
0
.0
0
4
1
**
*  
0
.0
0
3
3
**
*  
0
.0
0
3
6
**
*  
0
.0
0
2
3
**
 
0
.0
0
3
2
**
*  
0
.0
0
3
2
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
B
el
D
u
m
 
−
0
.0
0
0
8
 
−
0
.0
0
2
2
**
 
−
0
.0
0
1
4
 
−
0
.0
0
1
3
 
−
0
.0
0
1
8
*  
−
0
.0
0
1
2
 
−
0
.0
0
1
7
*  
−
0
.0
0
0
9
 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
M
k
tR
tn
 
−
0
.0
3
3
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
2
9
6
**
*  
−
0
.0
2
4
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
3
3
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
3
2
8
**
*  
−
0
.0
3
8
7
**
*  
−
0
.0
2
9
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
3
6
4
**
*  
(0
.0
0
5
7
) 
(0
.0
0
5
4
) 
(0
.0
0
5
1
) 
(0
.0
0
5
7
) 
(0
.0
0
5
6
) 
(0
.0
0
5
0
) 
(0
.0
0
5
5
) 
(0
.0
0
5
6
) 
M
k
tR
is
k
 
0
.0
6
7
0
**
*  
0
.0
5
6
4
**
*  
0
.0
5
3
4
**
*  
0
.0
6
2
2
**
*  
0
.0
5
8
2
**
*  
0
.0
4
7
7
**
*  
0
.0
6
0
3
**
*  
0
.0
6
5
9
**
*  
(0
.0
0
6
0
) 
(0
.0
0
5
3
) 
(0
.0
0
5
0
) 
(0
.0
0
6
0
) 
(0
.0
0
6
1
) 
(0
.0
0
5
5
) 
(0
.0
0
5
6
) 
(0
.0
0
5
9
) 
N
as
d
aq
 
0
.0
0
7
9
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
9
**
*  
0
.0
0
1
5
 
0
.0
0
8
9
**
*  
0
.0
0
9
9
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
8
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
4
**
*  
0
.0
0
6
8
**
*  
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
M
o
n
d
ay
 
0
.0
0
2
9
**
 
0
.0
0
2
4
**
 
0
.0
0
1
8
 
0
.0
0
2
9
**
 
0
.0
0
2
9
**
 
0
.0
0
3
1
**
*  
0
.0
0
3
1
**
 
0
.0
0
3
0
**
 
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
N
as
d
aq
R
ef
 
−
0
.0
0
4
9
**
*  
0
.0
0
4
5
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
4
1
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
4
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
3
7
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
3
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
4
6
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
M
k
tB
u
b
b
le
 
0
.0
2
8
9
**
*  
0
.0
2
9
1
**
*  
0
.0
2
8
2
**
*  
0
.0
3
0
7
**
*  
0
.0
3
0
5
**
*  
0
.0
2
3
4
**
*  
0
.0
3
1
2
**
*  
0
.0
2
9
2
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
lo
g(
S
al
es
) 
−
0
.0
0
0
3
 
−
0
.0
0
0
4
 
−
0
.0
0
0
3
 
−
0
.0
0
0
3
 
−
0
.0
0
0
2
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
−
0
.0
0
0
2
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
lo
g(
A
ge
) 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
 
−
0
.0
0
0
6
*  
−
0
.0
0
0
2
 
−
0
.0
0
0
3
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
−
0
.0
0
0
0
2
 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
3
) 
(0
.0
0
0
3
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
3
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
31 
 
V
aR
0.9
5 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
T
a
b
le
 V
 —
 C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
 
H
o
tM
k
t 
0
.0
0
2
3
 
0
.0
0
3
5
*  
0
.0
0
3
2
*  
0
.0
0
3
0
 
0
.0
0
2
7
 
0
.0
0
1
9
 
0
.0
0
3
1
*  
0
.0
0
3
1
*  
 (
0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
C
o
ld
M
k
t 
0
.0
0
5
4
*  
0
.0
0
3
0
 
0
.0
0
3
5
 
0
.0
0
5
2
*  
0
.0
0
5
8
*  
0
.0
0
5
7
**
 
0
.0
0
5
7
*  
0
.0
0
5
2
*  
 (
0
.0
0
3
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
8
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
O
ilG
as
 
−
0
.0
0
1
7
 
−
0
.0
0
0
8
 
−
0
.0
0
1
9
 
−
0
.0
0
2
2
 
−
0
.0
0
2
4
 
−
0
.0
0
3
1
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
0
 
−
0
.0
0
1
6
 
 (
0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
C
h
em
P
ro
d
 
−
0
.0
0
1
2
 
−
0
.0
0
1
7
 
−
0
.0
0
2
0
 
−
0
.0
0
2
1
 
−
0
.0
0
2
5
 
−
0
.0
0
0
4
 
−
0
.0
0
2
2
 
−
0
.0
0
1
0
 
 (
0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
M
an
u
f 
0
.0
0
0
8
 
0
.0
0
2
6
*  
0
.0
0
3
2
**
 
0
.0
0
1
6
 
0
.0
0
1
6
 
0
.0
0
1
2
 
0
.0
0
2
0
 
0
.0
0
1
2
 
 (
0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
C
o
m
p
u
te
rs
 
0
.0
0
4
9
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
1
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
0
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
4
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
4
**
*  
0
.0
0
3
1
**
*  
0
.0
0
6
0
**
*  
0
.0
0
4
9
**
*  
 (
0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
E
le
ct
E
q
 
0
.0
0
7
3
**
*  
0
.0
0
9
3
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
9
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
5
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
9
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
1
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
7
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
0
**
*  
 (
0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
T
ra
n
sp
 
−
0
.0
0
1
3
 
0
.0
0
0
8
 
0
.0
0
0
4
 
−
0
.0
0
1
2
 
−
0
.0
0
0
9
 
−
0
.0
0
1
0
 
−
0
.0
0
0
7
 
−
0
.0
0
1
3
 
 (
0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
S
ci
en
ti
fi
cI
n
st
 
0
.0
0
1
7
 
0
.0
0
2
1
 
0
.0
0
2
1
 
0
.0
0
1
6
 
0
.0
0
1
6
 
0
.0
0
2
2
 
0
.0
0
1
8
 
0
.0
0
2
0
 
 (
0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
 
0
.0
0
0
7
 
−
0
.0
0
1
3
 
−
0
.0
0
2
5
 
−
0
.0
0
0
3
 
0
.0
0
0
9
 
0
.0
0
1
1
 
−
0
.0
0
1
0
 
−
0
.0
0
0
7
 
 (
0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
U
ti
lit
ie
s 
−
0
.0
0
8
4
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
6
8
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
7
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
8
6
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
8
4
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
7
2
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
7
6
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
8
3
**
*  
 (
0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
R
et
ai
l 
0
.0
0
1
6
 
0
.0
0
5
0
**
*  
0
.0
0
4
5
**
*  
0
.0
0
1
4
 
0
.0
0
1
5
 
−
0
.0
0
0
2
 
0
.0
0
2
3
*  
0
.0
0
1
3
 
 (
0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
F
in
S
er
v
 
−
0
.0
0
2
3
 
−
0
.0
0
1
8
 
−
0
.0
0
2
1
 
−
0
.0
0
2
2
 
−
0
.0
0
2
0
 
−
0
.0
0
1
3
 
−
0
.0
0
2
2
 
−
0
.0
0
1
9
 
 (
0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
H
ea
lt
h
 
−
0
.0
0
1
8
 
−
0
.0
0
0
3
 
−
0
.0
0
0
0
3
 
−
0
.0
0
1
7
 
−
0
.0
0
1
9
 
−
0
.0
0
2
2
 
−
0
.0
0
1
1
 
−
0
.0
0
1
6
 
 (
0
.0
0
2
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
2
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
C
o
n
st
an
t 
0
.0
6
5
3
**
*  
0
.0
1
2
6
**
 
0
.0
0
7
8
*  
0
.0
5
9
7
**
*  
0
.0
5
7
9
**
*  
0
.0
6
0
8
**
*  
0
.0
5
1
2
**
*  
0
.0
6
5
8
**
*  
 (
0
.0
0
4
2
) 
(0
.0
0
5
5
) 
(0
.0
0
4
3
) 
(0
.0
0
4
8
) 
(0
.0
0
4
4
) 
(0
.0
0
4
0
) 
(0
.0
0
4
4
) 
(0
.0
0
4
4
) 
Observations 
2, 413 
2, 286 
2, 286 
2, 409 
2, 409 
2, 409 
2, 413 
2, 413 
A
d
ju
st
ed
 R
2
 
0
.6
0
2
2
 
0
.6
8
1
9
 
0
.7
0
7
8
 
0
.5
9
5
6
 
0
.6
0
2
6
 
0
.6
5
7
8
 
0
.6
1
7
8
 
0
.6
0
5
6
 
F
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
 
9
7
.0
9
0
1
**
*  
1
2
9
.9
1
4
6
**
*  
1
4
6
.6
7
1
3
**
*  
9
4
.3
2
5
0
**
*  
9
7
.1
0
6
5
**
*  
1
2
2
.8
3
3
5
**
*  
1
0
3
.5
8
7
9
**
*  
9
8
.4
5
7
6
**
* 
32 
 
V
aR
0.9
5 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
In
it
R
tn
 
0
.0
0
7
7
**
*  
(0
.0
02
3)
 
Q
u
o
te
d
S
p
 
0
.7
7
1
9
**
*  
(0
.0
79
3)
 
R
ea
lS
p
 
1
.2
7
9
4
**
*  
(0
.0
75
7)
 
K
yl
e 
λ 
0
.0
0
1
6
**
 
(0
.0
00
7)
 
K
yl
e 
λ 
C
N
 
0
.0
0
0
4
**
*  
(0.0001) 
K
yl
e 
λ 
C
Q
 
0
.2
9
2
3
**
*  
(0.0212) 
Il
liq
u
id
it
y 
0
.0
0
3
9
**
*  
(0.0008) 
T
u
rn
o
v
er
 
0
.6
5
8
1
**
*  
(0
.1
55
6)
 
U
w
R
an
k
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 
0
.0
0
1
3
**
 
0
.0
0
1
4
**
*  
0
.0
0
0
3
 
0
.0
0
0
0
5
 
0
.0
0
0
0
0
1
 
0
.0
0
0
5
 
0
.0
0
0
3
 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
N
u
m
U
w
 
−
0
.0
0
1
9
 
−
0
.0
0
2
2
**
 
−
0
.0
0
4
1
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
2
*  
−
0
.0
0
1
4
 
−
0
.0
0
2
0
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
4
**
 
−
0
.0
0
2
4
**
 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
V
C
-b
ac
k
ed
 
0
.0
0
1
9
 
0
.0
0
1
3
 
0
.0
0
0
6
 
0
.0
0
1
6
 
0
.0
0
1
5
 
0
.0
0
1
3
 
0
.0
0
1
8
 
0
.0
0
2
7
 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
lo
g(
E
B
IT
D
A
) 
−
0
.0
0
2
0
**
 
−
0
.0
0
2
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
3
5
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
1
**
 
−
0
.0
0
2
2
**
 
−
0
.0
0
1
3
 
−
0
.0
0
2
5
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
1
**
 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
E
B
IT
D
A
D
u
m
 
0
.0
2
9
0
**
*  
0
.0
3
4
1
**
*  
0
.0
3
7
1
**
*  
0
.0
2
9
6
**
*  
0
.0
2
9
5
**
*  
0
.0
2
0
1
**
*  
0
.0
3
2
0
**
*  
0
.0
3
0
1
**
*  
(0
.0
0
7
0
) 
(0
.0
0
7
0
) 
(0
.0
0
7
0
) 
(0
.0
0
7
1
) 
(0
.0
0
7
0
) 
(0
.0
0
6
4
) 
(0
.0
0
7
1
) 
(0
.0
0
7
0
) 
lo
g(
A
ss
et
s)
 
−
0
.0
0
5
6
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
5
2
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
5
1
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
6
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
6
4
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
5
1
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
5
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
5
0
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
lo
g(
L
ev
er
ag
e)
 
−
0
.0
0
0
3
 
−
0
.0
0
0
7
 
−
0
.0
0
0
6
 
−
0
.0
0
0
4
 
−
0
.0
0
0
4
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
T
a
b
le
 V
I:
 I
n
it
ia
l 
R
e
tu
rn
, 
L
iq
u
id
it
y
 a
n
d
 V
a
u
le
-a
t-
R
is
k
 f
o
r 
C
o
n
fi
d
e
n
c
e
 L
e
v
e
l 
c 
=
 0
.9
9
 
V
 a
R
 i
s 
th
e 
v
al
u
e-
at
-r
is
k
 f
o
r 
co
n
fi
d
en
ce
 l
ev
el
 c
 =
 0
.9
5
. 
In
it
R
tn
 i
s 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
 a
ft
er
 t
h
e 
fi
rs
t 
d
ay
 o
f 
tr
ad
in
g.
 Q
u
o
te
d
S
p
 i
s 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 q
u
o
te
d
 s
p
re
ad
. 
R
e
a
lS
p
 i
s 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 r
ea
li
se
d
 s
p
re
ad
. 
K
yl
e 
λ 
is
 K
yl
e’
s 
(1
9
8
5
) 
m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
th
e 
ex
te
n
t 
to
 w
h
ic
h
 o
rd
er
 f
lo
w
 i
m
p
ac
ts
 o
n
 p
ri
ce
s.
 K
yl
e 
λ 
C
N
 i
s 
K
yl
e’
s 
(1
9
8
5
) 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 λ
 a
d
ju
st
ed
 f
o
r 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
sh
ar
es
 o
u
ts
ta
n
d
in
g 
an
d
 c
lo
si
n
g 
p
ri
ce
s.
 K
yl
e 
λ 
C
Q
 i
s 
K
yl
e’
s 
(1
9
8
5
) 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 λ
 a
d
ju
st
ed
 f
o
r 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
tr
ad
es
 a
n
d
 c
lo
si
n
g 
p
ri
ce
s.
 I
ll
iq
u
id
it
y
 i
s 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
ab
so
lu
te
 d
ai
ly
 
re
tu
rn
s 
to
 t
ra
d
in
g 
v
o
lu
m
e.
 T
u
rn
o
v
e
r 
is
 t
h
e 
av
er
ag
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
sh
ar
es
 t
ra
d
ed
. 
U
w
R
a
n
k
 m
ea
su
re
s 
u
n
d
er
w
ri
te
r 
re
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
. 
N
u
m
U
w
 i
s 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
u
n
d
er
w
ri
te
rs
 i
n
 t
h
e 
IP
O
. 
V
 C
 −
 
b
a
c
ke
d
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 v
en
tu
re
 c
ap
it
al
 b
ac
k
ed
 I
P
O
. 
E
B
IT
D
A
 a
re
 e
ar
n
in
gs
 b
ef
o
re
 i
n
te
re
st
, 
ta
x
, 
d
ep
re
ci
at
io
n
, 
an
d
 a
m
o
rt
iz
at
io
n
. 
E
B
IT
D
A
D
u
m
 i
s 
a 
d
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
b
le
, 
co
d
ed
 o
n
e 
if
 E
B
IT
D
A
 i
s 
n
eg
at
iv
e.
 A
ss
e
ts
 a
re
 a
ss
et
s 
at
 b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e.
 L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
 i
s 
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
 d
eb
t 
d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
. 
S
a
le
s 
is
 a
n
n
u
al
 s
al
es
. 
A
g
e 
is
 f
ir
m
 a
ge
. 
α
ˆ 
is
 L
el
an
d
 a
n
d
 P
yl
e’
s 
(1
9
7
7
) 
si
g
n
al
 o
f 
eq
u
it
y 
re
ta
in
ed
. 
O
m
eg
a
 i
s 
th
e 
fr
ac
ti
o
n
 o
f 
p
ri
m
ar
y 
sh
ar
es
 o
ff
er
ed
. 
O
ff
e
rP
ri
c
e
 i
s 
th
e 
o
ff
er
 p
ri
ce
. 
U
se
 i
s 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
u
se
s 
o
f 
p
ro
ce
ed
s.
 L
o
c
k 
−
 i
n
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 t
h
e 
p
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
a 
lo
ck
-i
n
 p
er
io
d
. 
O
ff
e
rS
iz
e
 i
s 
th
e 
am
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
p
ri
m
ar
y 
an
d
 s
ec
o
n
d
ar
y 
m
o
n
ey
 r
ai
se
d
. 
A
b
o
D
u
m
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
O
ff
e
rP
ri
c
e
 i
s 
ab
o
v
e 
th
e 
in
it
ia
l 
fi
li
n
g 
p
ri
ce
 r
an
ge
. 
B
e
lD
u
m
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
O
ff
e
rP
ri
c
e 
is
 b
el
o
w
 t
h
e 
in
it
ia
l 
fi
li
n
g 
p
ri
ce
 r
an
ge
. 
M
k
tR
e
t 
is
 t
h
e 
cu
m
u
la
ti
v
e 
N
Y
S
E
/
A
M
E
X
/
N
as
d
aq
 i
n
d
ex
 r
et
u
rn
. 
M
k
tR
is
k
 i
s 
th
e 
v
ar
ia
n
ce
 o
f 
M
kt
R
e
t.
 N
a
sd
a
q
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
a 
N
as
d
aq
 i
ss
u
e.
 M
o
n
d
a
y 
in
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 o
r 
st
ar
te
d
 t
ra
d
in
g 
o
n
 a
 M
o
n
d
ay
. 
N
a
sd
a
q
R
e
f 
in
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 a
ft
er
 J
an
u
ar
y 
1
9
9
7
. 
M
k
tB
u
b
b
le
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
th
e 
b
u
b
b
le
 
p
er
io
d
. 
H
o
tM
k
t 
in
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
a 
h
o
t 
n
ew
 i
ss
u
e 
p
er
io
d
. 
C
o
ld
M
k
t 
in
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
a 
co
ld
 n
ew
 i
ss
u
e 
p
er
io
d
. 
In
d
u
st
ry
 s
ec
to
r 
d
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
ca
p
tu
re
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
in
 t
h
e 
co
st
 o
f 
ca
p
it
al
 a
n
d
 b
u
si
n
es
s 
ri
sk
 a
cr
o
ss
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
 s
ec
to
rs
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 K
o
o
p
 a
n
d
 L
i’
s 
(2
0
0
1
) 
1
2
-i
n
d
u
st
ry
 s
ec
to
r 
cl
as
si
fi
ca
ti
o
n
: 
O
il
G
a
s 
is
 o
il
 a
n
d
 g
as
, 
C
h
e
m
P
ro
d
 i
s 
ch
em
ic
al
 p
ro
d
u
ct
s,
 M
a
n
u
f 
is
 m
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g,
 C
o
m
p
u
te
rs
 i
s 
co
m
p
u
te
rs
, 
E
le
c
tE
q
 i
s 
el
ec
tr
o
n
ic
 e
q
u
ip
m
en
t,
 T
ra
n
sp
 i
s 
tr
an
sp
o
rt
at
io
n
, 
S
c
ie
n
ti
fI
n
st
 i
s 
sc
ie
n
ti
fi
c 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
, 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
 i
s 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
, 
U
ti
li
ti
e
s 
is
 u
ti
li
ti
es
, 
R
e
ta
il
 i
s 
re
ta
il
, 
F
in
S
e
rv
 i
s 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 s
er
v
ic
es
, 
H
ea
lt
h
 i
s 
h
ea
lt
h
. 
D
et
ai
ls
 o
n
 v
ar
ia
b
le
 d
ef
in
it
io
n
s 
ar
e 
av
ai
la
b
le
 f
ro
m
 T
ab
le
 I
II
. 
**
*,
 *
*,
 *
 d
en
o
te
 1
%
, 
5
%
, 
an
d
 1
0
%
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
, 
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
 S
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 l
ev
el
s 
ar
e 
ad
ju
st
ed
 f
o
r 
ro
b
u
st
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
 e
rr
o
rs
. 
33 
 
V
aR
0.
99
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
T
a
b
le
 V
I 
—
 C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
 
α
ˆ 
−
0
.0
0
6
5
**
*  
−
0
.0
1
0
4
**
*  
−
0
.0
1
0
5
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
8
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
3
3
 
−
0
.0
0
3
2
*  
−
0
.0
0
7
8
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
8
2
**
*  
(0
.0
0
2
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
3
) 
(0
.0
0
2
3
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
2
1
) 
O
m
eg
a 
0
.0
1
0
1
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
9
**
*  
0
.0
1
0
3
**
*  
0
.0
1
0
3
**
*  
0
.0
1
0
2
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
6
**
*  
0
.0
1
0
8
**
*  
0
.0
0
9
7
**
*  
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
8
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
lo
g(
O
ff
er
P
ri
ce
) 
−
0
.0
1
2
7
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
5
7
*  
−
0
.0
0
4
2
 
−
0
.0
1
2
2
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
9
3
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
9
8
**
*  
−
0
.0
1
0
3
**
*  
−
0
.0
1
3
1
**
*  
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
lo
g(
1
+
U
se
) 
−
0
.0
0
5
8
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
3
4
*  
−
0
.0
0
3
8
**
 
−
0
.0
0
6
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
6
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
5
6
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
6
5
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
5
5
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
L
o
ck
-i
n
 
0
.0
0
7
4
**
*  
0
.0
0
6
6
**
*  
0
.0
0
6
4
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
9
**
*  
0
.0
0
6
9
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
1
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
0
**
*  
0
.0
0
6
6
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
lo
g(
O
ff
er
S
iz
e)
 
0
.0
0
5
2
**
*  
0
.0
1
1
1
**
*  
0
.0
1
2
0
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
4
**
*  
0
.0
0
6
0
**
*  
0
.0
0
2
7
**
 
0
.0
0
7
4
**
*  
0
.0
0
4
0
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
A
b
o
D
u
m
 
0
.0
0
3
2
*  
0
.0
0
5
1
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
4
**
*  
0
.0
0
4
7
**
 
0
.0
0
5
1
**
*  
0
.0
0
3
0
*  
0
.0
0
4
5
**
 
0
.0
0
4
5
**
 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
B
el
D
u
m
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
−
0
.0
0
1
9
 
−
0
.0
0
0
9
 
−
0
.0
0
0
8
 
−
0
.0
0
1
6
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
 
−
0
.0
0
1
3
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
M
k
tR
tn
 
−
0
.0
5
8
7
**
*  
−
0
.0
5
4
8
**
*  
−
0
.0
4
7
5
**
*  
−
0
.0
5
9
2
**
*  
−
0
.0
5
6
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
6
6
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
5
3
6
**
*  
−
0
.0
6
2
9
**
*  
(0
.0
1
1
2
) 
(0
.0
1
1
0
) 
(0
.0
1
0
8
) 
(0
.0
1
1
2
) 
(0
.0
1
1
1
) 
(0
.0
1
0
3
) 
(0
.0
1
1
0
) 
(0
.0
1
1
2
) 
M
k
tR
is
k
 
0
.1
2
7
1
**
*  
0
.1
0
8
2
**
*  
0
.1
0
5
0
**
*  
0
.1
1
8
1
**
*  
0
.1
1
3
3
**
*  
0
.0
9
6
4
**
*  
0
.1
1
8
7
**
*  
0
.1
2
5
8
**
*  
(0
.0
1
2
4
) 
(0
.0
1
2
0
) 
(0
.0
1
1
8
) 
(0
.0
1
2
5
) 
(0
.0
1
2
8
) 
(0
.0
1
1
8
) 
(0
.0
1
2
0
) 
(0
.0
1
2
2
) 
N
as
d
aq
 
0
.0
1
1
2
**
*  
0
.0
1
3
3
**
*  
0
.0
0
3
2
 
0
.0
1
3
1
**
*  
0
.0
1
4
4
**
*  
0
.0
1
0
7
**
*  
0
.0
1
1
8
**
*  
0
.0
0
9
5
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
M
o
n
d
ay
 
0
.0
0
3
1
 
0
.0
0
2
3
 
0
.0
0
1
6
 
0
.0
0
3
1
 
0
.0
0
3
1
 
0
.0
0
3
4
 
0
.0
0
3
3
 
0
.0
0
3
3
 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
3
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
N
as
d
aq
R
ef
 
−
0
.0
0
3
6
 
0
.0
1
0
1
**
*  
0
.0
1
2
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
5
 
−
0
.0
0
2
5
 
−
0
.0
0
1
9
 
−
0
.0
0
2
3
 
−
0
.0
0
3
3
 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
4
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
M
k
tB
u
b
b
le
 
0
.0
4
0
8
**
*  
0
.0
4
0
8
**
*  
0
.0
3
9
7
**
*  
0
.0
4
3
1
**
*  
0
.0
4
2
6
**
*  
0
.0
3
0
9
**
*  
0
.0
4
3
6
**
*  
0
.0
4
0
7
**
*  
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
1
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
lo
g(
S
al
es
) 
0
.0
0
0
7
 
0
.0
0
0
5
 
0
.0
0
0
6
 
0
.0
0
0
7
 
0
.0
0
1
0
 
0
.0
0
1
0
 
0
.0
0
0
8
 
0
.0
0
0
4
 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
lo
g(
A
ge
) 
−
0
.0
0
0
8
 
−
0
.0
0
1
4
**
 
−
0
.0
0
1
4
**
 
−
0
.0
0
1
0
 
−
0
.0
0
1
1
 
−
0
.0
0
0
8
 
−
0
.0
0
0
8
 
−
0
.0
0
0
7
 
(0
.0
0
0
7
) 
(0
.0
0
0
7
) 
(0
.0
0
0
7
) 
(0
.0
0
0
7
) 
(0
.0
0
0
7
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
7
) 
(0
.0
0
0
7
) 
34  
 
V
aR
0.9
9 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
T
a
b
le
 V
I 
—
 C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
 
H
o
tM
k
t 
0
.0
0
3
5
 
0
.0
0
4
9
 
0
.0
0
4
5
 
0
.0
0
4
4
 
0
.0
0
3
7
 
0
.0
0
2
4
 
0
.0
0
4
4
 
0
.0
0
4
4
 
 (
0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
C
o
ld
M
k
t 
0
.0
0
7
4
 
0
.0
0
2
9
 
0
.0
0
3
6
 
0
.0
0
7
3
 
0
.0
0
8
2
*  
0
.0
0
8
1
*  
0
.0
0
7
8
 
0
.0
0
7
2
 
 (
0
.0
0
5
0
) 
(0
.0
0
4
7
) 
(0
.0
0
4
7
) 
(0
.0
0
4
9
) 
(0
.0
0
4
9
) 
(0
.0
0
4
3
) 
(0
.0
0
5
0
) 
(0
.0
0
4
9
) 
O
ilG
as
 
−
0
.0
0
4
3
 
−
0
.0
0
2
9
 
−
0
.0
0
4
5
 
−
0
.0
0
5
0
 
−
0
.0
0
5
3
 
−
0
.0
0
6
4
**
 
−
0
.0
0
4
6
 
−
0
.0
0
3
9
 
 (
0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
C
h
em
P
ro
d
 
−
0
.0
0
1
2
 
−
0
.0
0
2
0
 
−
0
.0
0
2
4
 
−
0
.0
0
2
3
 
−
0
.0
0
2
9
 
0
.0
0
0
5
 
−
0
.0
0
2
4
 
−
0
.0
0
0
6
 
 (
0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
9
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
1
) 
M
an
u
f 
0
.0
0
0
4
 
0
.0
0
3
3
 
0
.0
0
4
0
 
0
.0
0
1
6
 
0
.0
0
1
5
 
0
.0
0
0
8
 
0
.0
0
1
8
 
0
.0
0
0
8
 
 (
0
.0
0
3
1
) 
(0
.0
0
3
1
) 
(0
.0
0
3
1
) 
(0
.0
0
3
1
) 
(0
.0
0
3
1
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
C
o
m
p
u
te
rs
 
0
.0
0
8
7
**
*  
0
.0
1
1
8
**
*  
0
.0
1
1
5
**
*  
0
.0
0
9
4
**
*  
0
.0
0
9
5
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
7
**
*  
0
.0
1
0
0
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
6
**
*  
 (
0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
E
le
ct
E
q
 
0
.0
1
1
8
**
*  
0
.0
1
4
5
**
*  
0
.0
1
3
9
**
*  
0
.0
1
1
9
**
*  
0
.0
1
2
7
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
9
**
*  
0
.0
1
2
1
**
*  
0
.0
1
1
2
**
*  
 (
0
.0
0
3
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
9
) 
(0
.0
0
2
9
) 
(0
.0
0
3
1
) 
(0
.0
0
3
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
9
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
1
) 
T
ra
n
sp
 
−
0
.0
0
2
6
 
0
.0
0
0
3
 
−
0
.0
0
0
3
 
−
0
.0
0
2
4
 
−
0
.0
0
1
9
 
−
0
.0
0
2
2
 
−
0
.0
0
1
8
 
−
0
.0
0
2
7
 
 (
0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
1
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
1
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
S
ci
en
ti
fi
cI
n
st
 
0
.0
0
4
2
 
0
.0
0
4
2
 
0
.0
0
4
2
 
0
.0
0
4
1
 
0
.0
0
4
1
 
0
.0
0
5
1
*  
0
.0
0
4
4
 
0
.0
0
4
7
 
 (
0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
9
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
 
0
.0
0
1
2
 
−
0
.0
0
1
3
 
−
0
.0
0
2
7
 
−
0
.0
0
0
3
 
0
.0
0
2
0
 
0
.0
0
2
3
 
−
0
.0
0
0
9
 
−
0
.0
0
0
7
 
 (
0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
7
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
7
) 
U
ti
lit
ie
s 
−
0
.0
1
2
4
**
*  
−
0
.0
1
1
4
**
*  
−
0
.0
1
3
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
1
2
6
**
*  
−
0
.0
1
2
3
**
*  
−
0
.0
1
0
3
**
 
−
0
.0
1
1
3
**
*  
−
0
.0
1
2
1
**
*  
 (
0
.0
0
4
6
) 
(0
.0
0
4
2
) 
(0
.0
0
4
3
) 
(0
.0
0
4
5
) 
(0
.0
0
4
5
) 
(0
.0
0
4
4
) 
(0
.0
0
4
4
) 
(0
.0
0
4
5
) 
R
et
ai
l 
0
.0
0
5
8
**
 
0
.0
1
0
3
**
*  
0
.0
0
9
4
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
6
**
 
0
.0
0
5
7
**
 
0
.0
0
2
8
 
0
.0
0
6
6
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
3
**
 
 (
0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
5
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
5
) 
(0
.0
0
2
5
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
F
in
S
er
v
 
−
0
.0
0
2
7
 
−
0
.0
0
3
1
 
−
0
.0
0
3
4
 
−
0
.0
0
2
7
 
−
0
.0
0
2
1
 
−
0
.0
0
1
1
 
−
0
.0
0
2
6
 
−
0
.0
0
2
2
 
 (
0
.0
0
2
9
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
2
9
) 
H
ea
lt
h
 
−
0
.0
0
1
9
 
0
.0
0
0
8
 
0
.0
0
1
0
 
−
0
.0
0
1
8
 
−
0
.0
0
2
2
 
−
0
.0
0
2
6
 
−
0
.0
0
1
1
 
−
0
.0
0
1
7
 
 (
0
.0
0
4
8
) 
(0
.0
0
4
4
) 
(0
.0
0
4
5
) 
(0
.0
0
4
8
) 
(0
.0
0
4
7
) 
(0
.0
0
4
5
) 
(0
.0
0
4
7
) 
(0
.0
0
4
7
) 
C
o
n
st
an
t 
0
.0
9
4
3
**
*  
0
.0
1
7
3
*  
0
.0
1
3
8
 
0
.0
8
3
6
**
*  
0
.0
8
2
7
**
*  
0
.0
8
7
9
**
*  
0
.0
7
6
5
**
*  
0
.0
9
5
8
**
*  
 (
0
.0
0
7
5
) 
(0
.0
0
9
9
) 
(0
.0
0
8
7
) 
(0
.0
0
8
3
) 
(0
.0
0
7
7
) 
(0
.0
0
7
0
) 
(0
.0
0
7
8
) 
(0
.0
0
7
7
) 
Observations 
2, 413 
2, 286 
2, 286 
2, 409 
2, 409 
2, 409 
2, 413 
2, 413 
A
d
ju
st
ed
 R
2
 
0
.5
2
7
2
 
0
.5
7
9
8
 
0
.5
9
1
5
 
0
.5
2
6
0
 
0
.5
3
1
7
 
0
.5
8
2
4
 
0
.5
3
6
4
 
0
.5
3
3
0
 
F
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
 
7
1
.7
6
6
7
**
*  
8
3
.9
7
4
2
**
*  
8
8
.0
6
5
4
**
*  
7
1
.3
3
2
5
**
*  
7
2
.9
4
8
5
**
*  
8
9
.3
6
0
5
**
*  
7
4
.4
5
0
9
**
*  
7
3
.4
3
0
6
**
* 
35 
 
C
V
aR
0.9
5 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
In
it
R
tn
 
0
.0
0
7
0
**
*  
(0
.0
01
8)
 
Q
u
o
te
d
S
p
 
0
.6
9
0
5
**
*  
(0
.0
68
8)
 
R
ea
lS
p
 
1
.1
4
8
5
**
*  
(0
.0
61
5)
 
K
yl
e 
λ 
0
.0
0
1
3
**
 
(0
.0
00
6)
 
K
yl
e 
λ 
C
N
 
0
.0
0
0
4
**
*  
(0.0001) 
K
yl
e 
λ 
C
Q
 
0
.2
5
1
4
**
*  
(0.0176) 
Il
liq
u
id
it
y 
0
.0
0
3
6
**
*  
(0.0007) 
T
u
rn
o
v
er
 
0
.5
8
1
7
**
*  
(0
.1
32
1)
 
U
w
R
an
k
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
0
.0
0
1
0
**
 
0
.0
0
1
0
**
 
0
.0
0
0
0
4
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
−
0
.0
0
0
2
 
0
.0
0
0
3
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
N
u
m
U
w
 
−
0
.0
0
1
5
 
−
0
.0
0
1
7
*  
−
0
.0
0
3
4
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
1
7
*  
−
0
.0
0
1
0
 
−
0
.0
0
1
6
*  
−
0
.0
0
1
9
**
 
−
0
.0
0
1
9
**
 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
V
C
-b
ac
k
ed
 
0
.0
0
1
4
 
0
.0
0
1
0
 
0
.0
0
0
4
 
0
.0
0
1
1
 
0
.0
0
1
0
 
0
.0
0
0
9
 
0
.0
0
1
3
 
0
.0
0
2
1
 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
lo
g(
E
B
IT
D
A
) 
−
0
.0
0
1
6
**
 
−
0
.0
0
2
4
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
1
6
**
 
−
0
.0
0
1
7
**
 
−
0
.0
0
0
9
 
−
0
.0
0
2
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
1
6
**
 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
7
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
E
B
IT
D
A
D
u
m
 
0
.0
2
3
7
**
*  
0
.0
2
8
3
**
*  
0
.0
3
0
9
**
*  
0
.0
2
4
2
**
*  
0
.0
2
4
1
**
*  
0
.0
1
6
1
**
*  
0
.0
2
6
4
**
*  
0
.0
2
4
7
**
*  
(0
.0
0
5
8
) 
(0
.0
0
5
8
) 
(0
.0
0
5
8
) 
(0
.0
0
5
9
) 
(0
.0
0
5
8
) 
(0
.0
0
5
3
) 
(0
.0
0
5
9
) 
(0
.0
0
5
9
) 
lo
g(
A
ss
et
s)
 
−
0
.0
0
4
7
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
4
4
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
4
3
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
5
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
5
4
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
4
3
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
5
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
4
2
**
*  
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
lo
g(
L
ev
er
ag
e)
 
−
0
.0
0
0
3
 
−
0
.0
0
0
6
*  
−
0
.0
0
0
5
 
−
0
.0
0
0
3
 
−
0
.0
0
0
4
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
3
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
0
4
) 
T
a
b
le
 V
II
: 
In
it
ia
l 
R
e
tu
rn
, 
L
iq
u
id
it
y
 a
n
d
 C
o
n
d
it
io
n
a
l 
V
a
u
le
-a
t-
R
is
k
 f
o
r 
C
o
n
fi
d
e
n
c
e
 L
e
v
e
l 
c 
=
 0
.9
5
 
C
V
 a
R
 i
s 
th
e 
co
n
d
it
io
n
al
 v
al
u
e-
at
-r
is
k
 f
o
r 
co
n
fi
d
en
ce
 l
ev
el
 c
 =
 0
.9
5
. 
In
it
R
tn
 i
s 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
 a
ft
er
 t
h
e 
fi
rs
t 
d
ay
 o
f 
tr
ad
in
g.
 Q
u
o
te
d
S
p
 i
s 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 q
u
o
te
d
 s
p
re
ad
. 
R
ea
lS
p
 i
s 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 r
ea
li
se
d
 s
p
re
ad
. 
K
yl
e 
λ 
is
 K
yl
e’
s 
(1
9
8
5
) 
m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
th
e 
ex
te
n
t 
to
 w
h
ic
h
 o
rd
er
 f
lo
w
 i
m
p
ac
ts
 o
n
 p
ri
ce
s.
 K
yl
e 
λ 
C
N
 i
s 
K
yl
e’
s 
(1
9
8
5
) 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 λ
 a
d
ju
st
ed
 f
o
r 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
sh
ar
es
 o
u
ts
ta
n
d
in
g 
an
d
 c
lo
si
n
g 
p
ri
ce
s.
 K
yl
e 
λ 
C
Q
 i
s 
K
yl
e’
s 
(1
9
8
5
) 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 λ
 a
d
ju
st
ed
 f
o
r 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
tr
ad
es
 a
n
d
 c
lo
si
n
g 
p
ri
ce
s.
 I
ll
iq
u
id
it
y
 i
s 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
ab
so
lu
te
 d
ai
ly
 r
et
u
rn
s 
to
 t
ra
d
in
g 
v
o
lu
m
e.
 T
u
rn
o
v
e
r 
is
 t
h
e 
av
er
ag
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
sh
ar
es
 t
ra
d
ed
. 
U
w
R
a
n
k 
m
ea
su
re
s 
u
n
d
er
w
ri
te
r 
re
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
. 
N
u
m
U
w
 i
s 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
u
n
d
er
w
ri
te
rs
 i
n
 t
h
e 
IP
O
. 
V
 C
 −
 b
a
c
k
ed
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 v
en
tu
re
 c
ap
it
al
 b
ac
k
ed
 I
P
O
. 
E
B
IT
D
A
 a
re
 e
ar
n
in
gs
 b
ef
o
re
 i
n
te
re
st
, 
ta
x
, 
d
ep
re
ci
at
io
n
, 
an
d
 a
m
o
rt
iz
at
io
n
. 
E
B
IT
D
A
D
u
m
 i
s 
a 
d
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
b
le
, 
co
d
ed
 o
n
e 
if
 
E
B
IT
D
A
 i
s 
n
eg
at
iv
e.
 A
ss
e
ts
 a
re
 a
ss
et
s 
at
 b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e.
 L
ev
e
ra
g
e
 i
s 
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
 d
eb
t 
d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
. 
S
a
le
s 
is
 a
n
n
u
al
 s
al
es
. 
A
g
e
 i
s 
fi
rm
 a
ge
. 
α
ˆ 
is
 L
el
an
d
 a
n
d
 P
yl
e’
s 
(1
9
7
7
) 
si
g
n
al
 o
f 
eq
u
it
y 
re
ta
in
ed
. 
O
m
e
g
a
 i
s 
th
e 
fr
ac
ti
o
n
 o
f 
p
ri
m
ar
y 
sh
ar
es
 o
ff
er
ed
. 
O
ff
e
rP
ri
c
e
 i
s 
th
e 
o
ff
er
 p
ri
ce
. 
U
se
 i
s 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
u
se
s 
o
f 
p
ro
ce
ed
s.
 L
o
c
k
 −
 i
n
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 t
h
e 
p
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
a 
lo
ck
-i
n
 
p
er
io
d
. 
O
ff
e
rS
iz
e
 i
s 
th
e 
am
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
p
ri
m
ar
y 
an
d
 s
ec
o
n
d
ar
y 
m
o
n
ey
 r
ai
se
d
. 
A
b
o
D
u
m
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
O
ff
e
rP
ri
c
e
 i
s 
ab
o
v
e 
th
e 
in
it
ia
l 
fi
li
n
g 
p
ri
ce
 r
an
ge
. 
B
e
lD
u
m
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
O
ff
e
rP
ri
c
e
 i
s 
b
el
o
w
 
th
e 
in
it
ia
l 
fi
li
n
g 
p
ri
ce
 r
an
ge
. 
M
kt
R
e
t 
is
 t
h
e 
cu
m
u
la
ti
v
e 
N
Y
S
E
/
A
M
E
X
/
N
as
d
aq
 i
n
d
ex
 r
et
u
rn
. 
M
k
tR
is
k
 i
s 
th
e 
v
ar
ia
n
ce
 o
f 
M
k
tR
e
t.
 N
a
sd
a
q
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
a 
N
as
d
aq
 i
ss
u
e.
 M
o
n
d
a
y 
in
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 o
r 
st
ar
te
d
 t
ra
d
in
g 
o
n
 a
 M
o
n
d
ay
. 
N
a
sd
a
q
R
e
f 
in
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 a
ft
er
 J
an
u
ar
y 
1
9
9
7
. 
M
k
tB
u
b
b
le
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
th
e 
b
u
b
b
le
 
p
er
io
d
. 
H
o
tM
k
t 
in
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
a 
h
o
t 
n
ew
 i
ss
u
e 
p
er
io
d
. 
C
o
ld
M
k
t 
in
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
a 
co
ld
 n
ew
 i
ss
u
e 
p
er
io
d
. 
In
d
u
st
ry
 s
ec
to
r 
d
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
ca
p
tu
re
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
in
 t
h
e 
co
st
 o
f 
ca
p
it
al
 a
n
d
 b
u
si
n
es
s 
ri
sk
 a
cr
o
ss
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
 s
ec
to
rs
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 K
o
o
p
 a
n
d
 L
i’
s 
(2
0
0
1
) 
1
2
-i
n
d
u
st
ry
 s
ec
to
r 
cl
as
si
fi
ca
ti
o
n
: 
O
il
G
a
s 
is
 o
il
 a
n
d
 g
as
, 
C
h
e
m
P
ro
d
 i
s 
ch
em
ic
al
 p
ro
d
u
ct
s,
 M
a
n
u
f 
is
 m
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g,
 C
o
m
p
u
te
rs
 i
s 
co
m
p
u
te
rs
, 
E
le
c
tE
q
 i
s 
el
ec
tr
o
n
ic
 e
q
u
ip
m
en
t,
 T
ra
n
sp
 i
s 
tr
an
sp
o
rt
at
io
n
, 
S
c
ie
n
ti
fI
n
st
 i
s 
sc
ie
n
ti
fi
c 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
, 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
 i
s 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
, 
U
ti
li
ti
e
s 
is
 u
ti
li
ti
es
, 
R
e
ta
il
 i
s 
re
ta
il
, 
F
in
S
e
rv
 i
s 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 s
er
v
ic
es
, 
H
ea
lt
h
 i
s 
h
ea
lt
h
. 
D
et
ai
ls
 o
n
 v
ar
ia
b
le
 d
ef
in
it
io
n
s 
ar
e 
av
ai
la
b
le
 f
ro
m
 T
ab
le
 I
II
. 
**
*,
 *
*,
 *
 d
en
o
te
 1
%
, 
5
%
, 
an
d
 1
0
%
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
, 
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
 S
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 l
ev
el
s 
ar
e 
ad
ju
st
ed
 f
o
r 
ro
b
u
st
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
 e
rr
o
rs
. 
36 
 
C
V
aR
0.9
5 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
T
a
b
le
 V
II
 —
 C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
 
α
ˆ 
−
0
.0
0
5
5
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
9
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
9
2
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
6
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
9
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
8
*  
−
0
.0
0
6
8
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
7
1
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
O
m
eg
a 
0
.0
0
8
8
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
7
**
*  
0
.0
0
9
0
**
*  
0
.0
0
9
0
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
8
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
5
**
*  
0
.0
0
9
4
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
4
**
*  
(0
.0
0
2
3
) 
(0
.0
0
2
3
) 
(0
.0
0
2
3
) 
(0
.0
0
2
3
) 
(0
.0
0
2
3
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
3
) 
(0
.0
0
2
3
) 
lo
g(
O
ff
er
P
ri
ce
) 
−
0
.0
1
1
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
5
6
**
 
−
0
.0
0
4
2
 
−
0
.0
1
1
4
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
8
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
9
3
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
9
7
**
*  
−
0
.0
1
2
2
**
*  
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
8
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
5
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
8
) 
lo
g(
1
+
U
se
) 
−
0
.0
0
5
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
8
*  
−
0
.0
0
3
2
**
 
−
0
.0
0
5
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
5
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
4
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
5
7
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
4
7
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
L
o
ck
-i
n
 
0
.0
0
6
5
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
6
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
4
**
*  
0
.0
0
6
9
**
*  
0
.0
0
6
0
**
*  
0
.0
0
4
5
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
0
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
8
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
lo
g(
O
ff
er
S
iz
e)
 
0
.0
0
4
5
**
*  
0
.0
0
9
7
**
*  
0
.0
1
0
5
**
*  
0
.0
0
6
3
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
3
**
*  
0
.0
0
2
4
**
 
0
.0
0
6
5
**
*  
0
.0
0
3
4
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
(0
.0
0
1
1
) 
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
A
b
o
D
u
m
 
0
.0
0
2
9
*  
0
.0
0
4
7
**
*  
0
.0
0
5
0
**
*  
0
.0
0
4
3
**
*  
0
.0
0
4
6
**
*  
0
.0
0
2
9
*  
0
.0
0
4
1
**
 
0
.0
0
4
1
**
 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
B
el
D
u
m
 
−
0
.0
0
0
4
 
−
0
.0
0
2
0
 
−
0
.0
0
1
0
 
−
0
.0
0
1
0
 
−
0
.0
0
1
7
 
−
0
.0
0
0
8
 
−
0
.0
0
1
4
 
−
0
.0
0
0
4
 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
M
k
tR
tn
 
−
0
.0
5
0
6
**
*  
−
0
.0
4
7
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
4
0
4
**
*  
−
0
.0
5
0
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
4
9
1
**
*  
−
0
.0
5
7
6
**
*  
−
0
.0
4
6
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
5
4
3
**
*  
(0
.0
0
9
4
) 
(0
.0
0
9
1
) 
(0
.0
0
8
9
) 
(0
.0
0
9
3
) 
(0
.0
0
9
2
) 
(0
.0
0
8
6
) 
(0
.0
0
9
1
) 
(0
.0
0
9
3
) 
M
k
tR
is
k
 
0
.1
0
6
9
**
*  
0
.0
8
9
6
**
*  
0
.0
8
6
7
**
*  
0
.0
9
9
4
**
*  
0
.0
9
4
9
**
*  
0
.0
8
0
3
**
*  
0
.0
9
9
2
**
*  
0
.1
0
5
7
**
*  
(0
.0
1
0
1
) 
(0
.0
0
9
6
) 
(0
.0
0
9
4
) 
(0
.0
1
0
2
) 
(0
.0
1
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
9
6
) 
(0
.0
0
9
7
) 
(0
.0
1
0
0
) 
N
as
d
aq
 
0
.0
0
9
7
**
*  
0
.0
1
1
7
**
*  
0
.0
0
2
6
 
0
.0
1
1
3
**
*  
0
.0
1
2
5
**
*  
0
.0
0
9
4
**
*  
0
.0
1
0
3
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
2
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
6
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
M
o
n
d
ay
 
0
.0
0
2
5
 
0
.0
0
1
8
 
0
.0
0
1
2
 
0
.0
0
2
5
 
0
.0
0
2
5
 
0
.0
0
2
8
 
0
.0
0
2
7
 
0
.0
0
2
7
 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
N
as
d
aq
R
ef
 
−
0
.0
0
3
7
**
 
0
.0
0
8
5
**
*  
0
.0
1
1
1
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
8
 
−
0
.0
0
2
8
 
−
0
.0
0
2
3
 
−
0
.0
0
2
6
 
−
0
.0
0
3
5
*  
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
M
k
tB
u
b
b
le
 
0
.0
3
6
2
**
*  
0
.0
3
6
3
**
*  
0
.0
3
5
3
**
*  
0
.0
3
8
3
**
*  
0
.0
3
7
9
**
*  
0
.0
2
7
9
**
*  
0
.0
3
8
8
**
*  
0
.0
3
6
2
**
*  
(0
.0
0
2
8
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
5
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
8
) 
lo
g(
S
al
es
) 
0
.0
0
0
4
 
0
.0
0
0
3
 
0
.0
0
0
4
 
0
.0
0
0
5
 
0
.0
0
0
7
 
0
.0
0
0
8
 
0
.0
0
0
5
 
0
.0
0
0
2
 
(0
.0
0
0
7
) 
(0
.0
0
0
7
) 
(0
.0
0
0
7
) 
(0
.0
0
0
7
) 
(0
.0
0
0
7
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
7
) 
(0
.0
0
0
7
) 
lo
g(
A
ge
) 
−
0
.0
0
0
6
 
−
0
.0
0
1
1
**
 
−
0
.0
0
1
2
**
 
−
0
.0
0
0
7
 
−
0
.0
0
0
9
 
−
0
.0
0
0
6
 
−
0
.0
0
0
6
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
37 
 
C
V
aR
0.9
5 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
T
a
b
le
 V
II
 —
 C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
 
H
o
tM
k
t 
0
.0
0
2
9
 
0
.0
0
4
3
 
0
.0
0
3
9
 
0
.0
0
3
7
 
0
.0
0
3
1
 
0
.0
0
2
0
 
0
.0
0
3
7
 
0
.0
0
3
8
 
 (
0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
8
) 
(0
.0
0
2
8
) 
(0
.0
0
2
9
) 
(0
.0
0
2
9
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
8
) 
(0
.0
0
2
8
) 
C
o
ld
M
k
t 
0
.0
0
6
4
 
0
.0
0
2
7
 
0
.0
0
3
4
 
0
.0
0
6
2
 
0
.0
0
7
1
*  
0
.0
0
6
9
*  
0
.0
0
6
8
 
0
.0
0
6
2
 
 (
0
.0
0
4
2
) 
(0
.0
0
4
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
9
) 
(0
.0
0
4
1
) 
(0
.0
0
4
1
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
4
1
) 
(0
.0
0
4
1
) 
O
ilG
as
 
−
0
.0
0
3
9
 
−
0
.0
0
2
5
 
−
0
.0
0
3
9
 
−
0
.0
0
4
5
 
−
0
.0
0
4
8
 
−
0
.0
0
5
7
**
 
−
0
.0
0
4
1
 
−
0
.0
0
3
6
 
 (
0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
2
9
) 
C
h
em
P
ro
d
 
−
0
.0
0
1
0
 
−
0
.0
0
1
6
 
−
0
.0
0
1
9
 
−
0
.0
0
1
9
 
−
0
.0
0
2
4
 
0
.0
0
0
5
 
−
0
.0
0
2
0
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
 
 (
0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
8
) 
(0
.0
0
2
9
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
5
) 
(0
.0
0
2
8
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
M
an
u
f 
0
.0
0
0
6
 
0
.0
0
3
2
 
0
.0
0
3
8
 
0
.0
0
1
6
 
0
.0
0
1
6
 
0
.0
0
1
0
 
0
.0
0
1
9
 
0
.0
0
1
0
 
 (
0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
5
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
C
o
m
p
u
te
rs
 
0
.0
0
7
4
**
*  
0
.0
1
0
2
**
*  
0
.0
1
0
0
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
0
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
1
**
*  
0
.0
0
4
8
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
6
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
3
**
*  
 (
0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
E
le
ct
E
q
 
0
.0
1
0
2
**
*  
0
.0
1
2
7
**
*  
0
.0
1
2
2
**
*  
0
.0
1
0
3
**
*  
0
.0
1
1
0
**
*  
0
.0
0
6
9
**
*  
0
.0
1
0
5
**
*  
0
.0
0
9
7
**
*  
 (
0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
4
) 
(0
.0
0
2
4
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
4
) 
(0
.0
0
2
5
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
T
ra
n
sp
 
−
0
.0
0
2
1
 
0
.0
0
0
6
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 
−
0
.0
0
1
9
 
−
0
.0
0
1
4
 
−
0
.0
0
1
7
 
−
0
.0
0
1
4
 
−
0
.0
0
2
2
 
 (
0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
5
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
S
ci
en
ti
fi
cI
n
st
 
0
.0
0
3
3
 
0
.0
0
3
6
 
0
.0
0
3
5
 
0
.0
0
3
3
 
0
.0
0
3
3
 
0
.0
0
4
1
*  
0
.0
0
3
5
 
0
.0
0
3
8
 
 (
0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
6
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
4
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
 
0
.0
0
0
9
 
−
0
.0
0
1
3
 
−
0
.0
0
2
6
 
−
0
.0
0
0
3
 
0
.0
0
1
6
 
0
.0
0
1
8
 
−
0
.0
0
1
0
 
−
0
.0
0
0
7
 
 (
0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
2
8
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
3
1
) 
(0
.0
0
3
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
9
) 
(0
.0
0
3
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
1
) 
U
ti
lit
ie
s 
−
0
.0
1
1
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
9
7
**
*  
−
0
.0
1
1
1
**
*  
−
0
.0
1
1
2
**
*  
−
0
.0
1
0
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
9
3
**
 
−
0
.0
1
0
1
**
*  
−
0
.0
1
0
7
**
*  
 (
0
.0
0
3
8
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
7
) 
(0
.0
0
3
7
) 
(0
.0
0
3
7
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
7
) 
R
et
ai
l 
0
.0
0
4
5
**
 
0
.0
0
8
6
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
8
**
*  
0
.0
0
4
3
**
 
0
.0
0
4
5
**
 
0
.0
0
1
9
 
0
.0
0
5
3
**
 
0
.0
0
4
1
*  
 (
0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
1
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
F
in
S
er
v
 
−
0
.0
0
2
7
 
−
0
.0
0
2
9
 
−
0
.0
0
3
2
 
−
0
.0
0
2
7
 
−
0
.0
0
2
3
 
−
0
.0
0
1
4
 
−
0
.0
0
2
7
 
−
0
.0
0
2
3
 
 (
0
.0
0
2
5
) 
(0
.0
0
2
3
) 
(0
.0
0
2
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
5
) 
(0
.0
0
2
5
) 
(0
.0
0
2
3
) 
(0
.0
0
2
5
) 
(0
.0
0
2
4
) 
H
ea
lt
h
 
−
0
.0
0
1
8
 
0
.0
0
0
5
 
0
.0
0
0
7
 
−
0
.0
0
1
7
 
−
0
.0
0
2
0
 
−
0
.0
0
2
4
 
−
0
.0
0
1
0
 
−
0
.0
0
1
6
 
 (
0
.0
0
4
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
7
) 
(0
.0
0
3
8
) 
(0
.0
0
4
0
) 
(0
.0
0
4
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
8
) 
(0
.0
0
3
9
) 
(0
.0
0
4
0
) 
C
o
n
st
an
t 
0
.0
8
4
9
**
*  
0
.0
1
6
1
*  
0
.0
1
2
8
*  
0
.0
7
5
9
**
*  
0
.0
7
4
8
**
*  
0
.0
7
9
2
**
*  
0
.0
6
8
5
**
*  
0
.0
8
6
1
**
*  
 (
0
.0
0
6
3
) 
(0
.0
0
8
3
) 
(0
.0
0
7
2
) 
(0
.0
0
7
0
) 
(0
.0
0
6
5
) 
(0
.0
0
5
9
) 
(0
.0
0
6
6
) 
(0
.0
0
6
5
) 
Observations 
2, 413 
2, 286 
2, 286 
2, 409 
2, 409 
2, 409 
2, 413 
2, 413 
A
d
ju
st
ed
 R
2
 
0
.5
4
2
7
 
0
.6
0
0
7
 
0
.6
1
4
2
 
0
.5
4
0
7
 
0
.5
4
6
7
 
0
.5
9
8
7
 
0
.5
5
3
5
 
0
.5
4
8
6
 
F
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
 
7
6
.3
1
3
5
**
*  
9
1
.4
7
0
5
**
*  
9
6
.7
2
9
9
**
*  
7
5
.5
9
2
3
**
*  
7
7
.4
3
8
0
**
*  
9
5
.5
5
8
9
**
*  
7
9
.6
7
8
3
**
*  
7
8
.1
4
3
1
**
* 
38 
 
C
V
aR
0.9
9 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
In
it
R
tn
 
0
.0
0
6
8
*  
(0
.0
03
7)
 
Q
u
o
te
d
S
p
 
0
.9
1
1
7
**
*  
(0
.1
18
5)
 
R
ea
lS
p
 
1
.4
1
4
8
**
*  
(0
.1
38
1)
 
K
yl
e 
λ 
0
.0
0
2
4
**
 
(0
.0
01
1)
 
K
yl
e 
λ 
C
N
 
0
.0
0
0
6
**
*  
(0.0002) 
K
yl
e 
λ 
C
Q
 
0
.3
8
3
0
**
*  
(0.0370) 
Il
liq
u
id
it
y 
0
.0
0
4
2
**
*  
(0.0012) 
T
u
rn
o
v
er
 
0
.8
8
7
1
**
*  
(0
.2
51
0)
 
U
w
R
an
k
 
0
.0
0
0
8
 
0
.0
0
2
3
**
 
0
.0
0
2
2
**
 
0
.0
0
1
1
 
0
.0
0
0
8
 
0
.0
0
0
7
 
0
.0
0
1
3
 
0
.0
0
1
1
 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
(0
.0
0
1
0
) 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
N
u
m
U
w
 
−
0
.0
0
3
8
*  
−
0
.0
0
4
4
**
 
−
0
.0
0
6
4
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
4
4
**
 
−
0
.0
0
3
2
 
−
0
.0
0
4
0
**
 
−
0
.0
0
4
3
**
 
−
0
.0
0
4
4
**
 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
V
C
-b
ac
k
ed
 
0
.0
0
3
2
 
0
.0
0
2
1
 
0
.0
0
1
3
 
0
.0
0
2
9
 
0
.0
0
2
8
 
0
.0
0
2
6
 
0
.0
0
3
1
 
0
.0
0
4
3
 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
lo
g(
E
B
IT
D
A
) 
−
0
.0
0
2
5
*  
−
0
.0
0
3
6
**
 
−
0
.0
0
4
2
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
6
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
8
*  
−
0
.0
0
1
6
 
−
0
.0
0
3
1
**
 
−
0
.0
0
2
6
*  
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
(0
.0
0
1
5
) 
E
B
IT
D
A
D
u
m
 
0
.0
3
5
9
**
*  
0
.0
4
1
0
**
*  
0
.0
4
4
1
**
*  
0
.0
3
6
2
**
*  
0
.0
3
6
1
**
*  
0
.0
2
3
9
**
 
0
.0
3
8
9
**
*  
0
.0
3
6
8
**
*  
(0
.0
1
1
7
) 
(0
.0
1
1
7
) 
(0
.0
1
1
7
) 
(0
.0
1
1
7
) 
(0
.0
1
1
5
) 
(0
.0
1
1
0
) 
(0
.0
1
1
7
) 
(0
.0
1
1
6
) 
lo
g(
A
ss
et
s)
 
−
0
.0
0
8
5
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
7
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
7
8
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
8
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
9
4
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
7
8
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
8
8
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
7
6
**
*  
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
(0
.0
0
1
8
) 
(0
.0
0
1
7
) 
lo
g(
L
ev
er
ag
e)
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
−
0
.0
0
0
6
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
0
.0
0
0
6
 
−
0
.0
0
0
3
 
0
.0
0
0
3
 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
(0
.0
0
0
8
) 
T
a
b
le
 V
II
I:
 I
n
it
ia
l 
R
e
tu
rn
, 
L
iq
u
id
it
y
 a
n
d
 C
o
n
d
it
io
n
a
l 
V
a
u
le
-a
t-
R
is
k
 f
o
r 
C
o
n
fi
d
e
n
c
e
 L
e
v
e
l 
c 
=
 0
.9
9
 
C
V
 a
R
 i
s 
th
e 
co
n
d
it
io
n
al
 v
al
u
e-
at
-r
is
k
 f
o
r 
co
n
fi
d
en
ce
 l
ev
el
 c
 =
 0
.9
9
. 
In
it
R
tn
 i
s 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
 a
ft
er
 t
h
e 
fi
rs
t 
d
ay
 o
f 
tr
ad
in
g.
 Q
u
o
te
d
S
p
 i
s 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 q
u
o
te
d
 s
p
re
ad
. 
R
ea
lS
p
 i
s 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 r
ea
li
se
d
 s
p
re
ad
. 
K
yl
e 
λ 
is
 K
yl
e’
s 
(1
9
8
5
) 
m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
th
e 
ex
te
n
t 
to
 w
h
ic
h
 o
rd
er
 f
lo
w
 i
m
p
ac
ts
 o
n
 p
ri
ce
s.
 K
yl
e 
λ 
C
N
 i
s 
K
yl
e’
s 
(1
9
8
5
) 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 λ
 a
d
ju
st
ed
 f
o
r 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
sh
ar
es
 o
u
ts
ta
n
d
in
g 
an
d
 c
lo
si
n
g 
p
ri
ce
s.
 K
yl
e 
λ 
C
Q
 i
s 
K
yl
e’
s 
(1
9
8
5
) 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 λ
 a
d
ju
st
ed
 f
o
r 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
tr
ad
es
 a
n
d
 c
lo
si
n
g 
p
ri
ce
s.
 I
ll
iq
u
id
it
y
 i
s 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
ab
so
lu
te
 d
ai
ly
 r
et
u
rn
s 
to
 t
ra
d
in
g 
v
o
lu
m
e.
 T
u
rn
o
v
e
r 
is
 t
h
e 
av
er
ag
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
sh
ar
es
 t
ra
d
ed
. 
U
w
R
a
n
k 
m
ea
su
re
s 
u
n
d
er
w
ri
te
r 
re
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
. 
N
u
m
U
w
 i
s 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
u
n
d
er
w
ri
te
rs
 i
n
 t
h
e 
IP
O
. 
V
 C
 −
 b
a
c
k
ed
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 v
en
tu
re
 c
ap
it
al
 b
ac
k
ed
 I
P
O
. 
E
B
IT
D
A
 a
re
 e
ar
n
in
gs
 b
ef
o
re
 i
n
te
re
st
, 
ta
x
, 
d
ep
re
ci
at
io
n
, 
an
d
 a
m
o
rt
iz
at
io
n
. 
E
B
IT
D
A
D
u
m
 i
s 
a 
d
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
b
le
, 
co
d
ed
 o
n
e 
if
 
E
B
IT
D
A
 i
s 
n
eg
at
iv
e.
 A
ss
e
ts
 a
re
 a
ss
et
s 
at
 b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e.
 L
ev
e
ra
g
e
 i
s 
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
 d
eb
t 
d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
. 
S
a
le
s 
is
 a
n
n
u
al
 s
al
es
. 
A
g
e
 i
s 
fi
rm
 a
ge
. 
α
ˆ 
is
 L
el
an
d
 a
n
d
 P
yl
e’
s 
(1
9
7
7
) 
si
g
n
al
 o
f 
eq
u
it
y 
re
ta
in
ed
. 
O
m
e
g
a
 i
s 
th
e 
fr
ac
ti
o
n
 o
f 
p
ri
m
ar
y 
sh
ar
es
 o
ff
er
ed
. 
O
ff
e
rP
ri
c
e
 i
s 
th
e 
o
ff
er
 p
ri
ce
. 
U
se
 i
s 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
u
se
s 
o
f 
p
ro
ce
ed
s.
 L
o
c
k
 −
 i
n
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 t
h
e 
p
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
a 
lo
ck
-i
n
 
p
er
io
d
. 
O
ff
e
rS
iz
e
 i
s 
th
e 
am
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
p
ri
m
ar
y 
an
d
 s
ec
o
n
d
ar
y 
m
o
n
ey
 r
ai
se
d
. 
A
b
o
D
u
m
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
O
ff
e
rP
ri
c
e
 i
s 
ab
o
v
e 
th
e 
in
it
ia
l 
fi
li
n
g 
p
ri
ce
 r
an
ge
. 
B
e
lD
u
m
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
O
ff
e
rP
ri
c
e
 i
s 
b
el
o
w
 
th
e 
in
it
ia
l 
fi
li
n
g 
p
ri
ce
 r
an
ge
. 
M
kt
R
e
t 
is
 t
h
e 
cu
m
u
la
ti
v
e 
N
Y
S
E
/
A
M
E
X
/
N
as
d
aq
 i
n
d
ex
 r
et
u
rn
. 
M
k
tR
is
k
 i
s 
th
e 
v
ar
ia
n
ce
 o
f 
M
k
tR
e
t.
 N
a
sd
a
q
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
a 
N
as
d
aq
 i
ss
u
e.
 M
o
n
d
a
y 
in
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 o
r 
st
ar
te
d
 t
ra
d
in
g 
o
n
 a
 M
o
n
d
ay
. 
N
a
sd
a
q
R
e
f 
in
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 a
ft
er
 J
an
u
ar
y 
1
9
9
7
. 
M
k
tB
u
b
b
le
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
th
e 
b
u
b
b
le
 
p
er
io
d
. 
H
o
tM
k
t 
in
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
a 
h
o
t 
n
ew
 i
ss
u
e 
p
er
io
d
. 
C
o
ld
M
k
t 
in
d
ic
at
es
 i
f 
an
 I
P
O
 i
s 
is
su
ed
 d
u
ri
n
g 
a 
co
ld
 n
ew
 i
ss
u
e 
p
er
io
d
. 
In
d
u
st
ry
 s
ec
to
r 
d
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
ca
p
tu
re
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
in
 t
h
e 
co
st
 o
f 
ca
p
it
al
 a
n
d
 b
u
si
n
es
s 
ri
sk
 a
cr
o
ss
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
 s
ec
to
rs
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 K
o
o
p
 a
n
d
 L
i’
s 
(2
0
0
1
) 
1
2
-i
n
d
u
st
ry
 s
ec
to
r 
cl
as
si
fi
ca
ti
o
n
: 
O
il
G
a
s 
is
 o
il
 a
n
d
 g
as
, 
C
h
e
m
P
ro
d
 i
s 
ch
em
ic
al
 p
ro
d
u
ct
s,
 M
a
n
u
f 
is
 m
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g,
 C
o
m
p
u
te
rs
 i
s 
co
m
p
u
te
rs
, 
E
le
c
tE
q
 i
s 
el
ec
tr
o
n
ic
 e
q
u
ip
m
en
t,
 T
ra
n
sp
 i
s 
tr
an
sp
o
rt
at
io
n
, 
S
c
ie
n
ti
fI
n
st
 i
s 
sc
ie
n
ti
fi
c 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
, 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
 i
s 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
, 
U
ti
li
ti
e
s 
is
 u
ti
li
ti
es
, 
R
e
ta
il
 i
s 
re
ta
il
, 
F
in
S
e
rv
 i
s 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 s
er
v
ic
es
, 
H
ea
lt
h
 i
s 
h
ea
lt
h
. 
D
et
ai
ls
 o
n
 v
ar
ia
b
le
 d
ef
in
it
io
n
s 
ar
e 
av
ai
la
b
le
 f
ro
m
 T
ab
le
 I
II
. 
**
*,
 *
*,
 *
 d
en
o
te
 1
%
, 
5
%
, 
an
d
 1
0
%
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
, 
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
 S
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 l
ev
el
s 
ar
e 
ad
ju
st
ed
 f
o
r 
ro
b
u
st
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
 e
rr
o
rs
. 
39 
 
C
V
aR
0.9
9 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
T
a
b
le
 V
II
I 
—
 C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
 
α
ˆ 
−
0
.0
0
6
9
*  
−
0
.0
1
1
7
**
*  
−
0
.0
1
1
6
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
8
5
**
 
−
0
.0
0
2
2
 
−
0
.0
0
2
2
 
−
0
.0
0
8
2
**
 
−
0
.0
0
8
8
**
 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
9
) 
(0
.0
0
3
9
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
O
m
eg
a 
0
.0
1
4
5
**
*  
0
.0
1
2
9
**
*  
0
.0
1
4
5
**
*  
0
.0
1
4
5
**
*  
0
.0
1
4
3
**
*  
0
.0
1
2
3
**
 
0
.0
1
5
2
**
*  
0
.0
1
3
8
**
*  
(0
.0
0
4
9
) 
(0
.0
0
5
0
) 
(0
.0
0
5
0
) 
(0
.0
0
4
9
) 
(0
.0
0
4
9
) 
(0
.0
0
4
8
) 
(0
.0
0
4
9
) 
(0
.0
0
4
9
) 
lo
g(
O
ff
er
P
ri
ce
) 
−
0
.0
1
3
8
**
 
−
0
.0
0
5
6
 
−
0
.0
0
4
3
 
−
0
.0
1
4
1
**
 
−
0
.0
0
9
9
*  
−
0
.0
1
0
7
**
 
−
0
.0
1
1
5
**
 
−
0
.0
1
5
0
**
*  
(0
.0
0
5
7
) 
(0
.0
0
5
8
) 
(0
.0
0
5
8
) 
(0
.0
0
5
8
) 
(0
.0
0
5
7
) 
(0
.0
0
5
4
) 
(0
.0
0
5
7
) 
(0
.0
0
5
8
) 
lo
g(
1
+
U
se
) 
−
0
.0
0
7
5
**
 
−
0
.0
0
5
6
*  
−
0
.0
0
6
3
*  
−
0
.0
0
8
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
8
8
**
*  
−
0
.0
0
7
1
**
 
−
0
.0
0
8
2
**
 
−
0
.0
0
6
9
**
 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
1
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
L
o
ck
-i
n
 
0
.0
0
8
6
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
9
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
7
**
 
0
.0
0
9
8
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
2
**
 
0
.0
0
5
8
*  
0
.0
0
9
3
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
7
**
 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
lo
g(
O
ff
er
S
iz
e)
 
0
.0
0
5
5
**
 
0
.0
1
3
2
**
*  
0
.0
1
3
8
**
*  
0
.0
0
8
7
**
*  
0
.0
0
6
6
**
 
0
.0
0
2
2
 
0
.0
0
7
8
**
*  
0
.0
0
3
8
 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
8
) 
(0
.0
0
2
9
) 
(0
.0
0
2
9
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
5
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
(0
.0
0
2
7
) 
A
b
o
D
u
m
 
0
.0
0
4
8
 
0
.0
0
6
2
*  
0
.0
0
6
4
*  
0
.0
0
6
1
*  
0
.0
0
6
6
*  
0
.0
0
3
9
 
0
.0
0
5
8
*  
0
.0
0
5
8
 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
B
el
D
u
m
 
0
.0
0
0
3
 
−
0
.0
0
1
3
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
−
0
.0
0
0
4
 
−
0
.0
0
1
3
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 
−
0
.0
0
0
8
 
0
.0
0
0
5
 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
M
k
tR
tn
 
−
0
.0
8
3
2
**
*  
−
0
.0
8
2
8
**
*  
−
0
.0
7
5
2
**
*  
−
0
.0
8
4
1
**
*  
−
0
.0
8
0
9
**
*  
−
0
.0
9
4
0
**
*  
−
0
.0
7
7
8
**
*  
−
0
.0
8
9
1
**
*  
(0
.0
2
0
5
) 
(0
.0
2
0
5
) 
(0
.0
2
0
4
) 
(0
.0
2
0
5
) 
(0
.0
2
0
3
) 
(0
.0
1
9
8
) 
(0
.0
2
0
4
) 
(0
.0
2
0
5
) 
M
k
tR
is
k
 
0
.1
8
1
9
**
*  
0
.1
4
8
6
**
*  
0
.1
4
6
6
**
*  
0
.1
6
9
7
**
*  
0
.1
6
4
8
**
*  
0
.1
4
3
0
**
*  
0
.1
7
3
0
**
*  
0
.1
8
0
5
**
*  
(0
.0
2
1
4
) 
(0
.0
2
1
1
) 
(0
.0
2
1
0
) 
(0
.0
2
1
6
) 
(0
.0
2
2
0
) 
(0
.0
2
1
2
) 
(0
.0
2
1
0
) 
(0
.0
2
1
1
) 
N
as
d
aq
 
0
.0
1
1
6
**
*  
0
.0
1
5
9
**
*  
0
.0
0
4
5
 
0
.0
1
4
1
**
*  
0
.0
1
5
6
**
*  
0
.0
1
0
7
**
*  
0
.0
1
2
2
**
*  
0
.0
0
9
1
**
*  
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
5
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
1
) 
(0
.0
0
3
2
) 
(0
.0
0
3
3
) 
M
o
n
d
ay
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
−
0
.0
0
1
0
 
−
0
.0
0
1
7
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
−
0
.0
0
0
1
 
0
.0
0
0
3
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 
0
.0
0
0
2
 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
4
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
(0
.0
0
3
6
) 
N
as
d
aq
R
ef
 
−
0
.0
0
0
0
4
 
0
.0
1
7
4
**
*  
0
.0
1
9
6
**
*  
0
.0
0
1
2
 
0
.0
0
1
1
 
0
.0
0
1
8
 
0
.0
0
1
2
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 
(0
.0
0
4
0
) 
(0
.0
0
4
3
) 
(0
.0
0
4
2
) 
(0
.0
0
4
0
) 
(0
.0
0
4
0
) 
(0
.0
0
3
9
) 
(0
.0
0
4
0
) 
(0
.0
0
4
0
) 
M
k
tB
u
b
b
le
 
0
.0
4
7
2
**
*  
0
.0
4
6
9
**
*  
0
.0
4
5
8
**
*  
0
.0
4
9
5
**
*  
0
.0
4
8
8
**
*  
0
.0
3
3
5
**
*  
0
.0
4
9
9
**
*  
0
.0
4
6
2
**
*  
(0
.0
0
5
8
) 
(0
.0
0
5
6
) 
(0
.0
0
5
6
) 
(0
.0
0
5
7
) 
(0
.0
0
5
7
) 
(0
.0
0
5
6
) 
(0
.0
0
5
7
) 
(0
.0
0
5
8
) 
lo
g(
S
al
es
) 
0
.0
0
2
3
*  
0
.0
0
2
0
 
0
.0
0
2
2
 
0
.0
0
2
4
*  
0
.0
0
2
8
**
 
0
.0
0
2
9
**
 
0
.0
0
2
5
*  
0
.0
0
2
1
 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
3
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
(0
.0
0
1
4
) 
lo
g(
A
ge
) 
−
0
.0
0
1
8
 
−
0
.0
0
2
5
**
 
−
0
.0
0
2
5
**
 
−
0
.0
0
2
1
*  
−
0
.0
0
2
2
*  
−
0
.0
0
1
8
 
−
0
.0
0
1
8
 
−
0
.0
0
1
6
 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
(0
.0
0
1
2
) 
40  
 
C
V
aR
0.9
9 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
T
a
b
le
 V
II
I 
—
 C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
 
H
o
tM
k
t 
0
.0
0
3
4
 
0
.0
0
5
3
 
0
.0
0
4
8
 
0
.0
0
4
2
 
0
.0
0
3
3
 
0
.0
0
1
6
 
0
.0
0
4
2
 
0
.0
0
4
3
 
 (
0
.0
0
5
7
) 
(0
.0
0
6
0
) 
(0
.0
0
6
0
) 
(0
.0
0
5
8
) 
(0
.0
0
5
9
) 
(0
.0
0
5
5
) 
(0
.0
0
5
8
) 
(0
.0
0
5
7
) 
C
o
ld
M
k
t 
0
.0
0
7
0
 
0
.0
0
1
4
 
0
.0
0
2
3
 
0
.0
0
6
8
 
0
.0
0
8
1
 
0
.0
0
7
8
 
0
.0
0
7
4
 
0
.0
0
6
7
 
 (
0
.0
0
7
7
) 
(0
.0
0
7
7
) 
(0
.0
0
7
7
) 
(0
.0
0
7
7
) 
(0
.0
0
7
7
) 
(0
.0
0
7
2
) 
(0
.0
0
7
8
) 
(0
.0
0
7
6
) 
O
ilG
as
 
−
0
.0
0
9
7
*  
−
0
.0
0
7
4
 
−
0
.0
0
9
2
 
−
0
.0
1
0
4
*  
−
0
.0
1
0
8
*  
−
0
.0
1
2
3
**
 
−
0
.0
0
9
9
*  
−
0
.0
0
9
0
 
 (
0
.0
0
5
8
) 
(0
.0
0
6
0
) 
(0
.0
0
6
0
) 
(0
.0
0
5
8
) 
(0
.0
0
5
8
) 
(0
.0
0
5
5
) 
(0
.0
0
5
8
) 
(0
.0
0
5
7
) 
C
h
em
P
ro
d
 
0
.0
0
0
3
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
 
−
0
.0
0
0
8
 
−
0
.0
0
0
6
 
−
0
.0
0
1
4
 
0
.0
0
3
0
 
−
0
.0
0
0
8
 
0
.0
0
1
5
 
 (
0
.0
0
6
4
) 
(0
.0
0
6
8
) 
(0
.0
0
6
9
) 
(0
.0
0
6
4
) 
(0
.0
0
6
4
) 
(0
.0
0
6
1
) 
(0
.0
0
6
5
) 
(0
.0
0
6
3
) 
M
an
u
f 
0
.0
0
0
0
4
 
0
.0
0
4
4
 
0
.0
0
5
1
 
0
.0
0
1
4
 
0
.0
0
1
2
 
0
.0
0
0
2
 
0
.0
0
1
4
 
0
.0
0
0
2
 
 (
0
.0
0
6
0
) 
(0
.0
0
6
5
) 
(0
.0
0
6
5
) 
(0
.0
0
6
0
) 
(0
.0
0
6
0
) 
(0
.0
0
6
0
) 
(0
.0
0
6
0
) 
(0
.0
0
5
9
) 
C
o
m
p
u
te
rs
 
0
.0
1
2
0
**
*  
0
.0
1
5
7
**
*  
0
.0
1
5
2
**
*  
0
.0
1
2
9
**
*  
0
.0
1
3
0
**
*  
0
.0
0
7
9
**
 
0
.0
1
3
3
**
*  
0
.0
1
1
5
**
*  
 (
0
.0
0
3
9
) 
(0
.0
0
3
9
) 
(0
.0
0
3
9
) 
(0
.0
0
3
9
) 
(0
.0
0
3
9
) 
(0
.0
0
3
8
) 
(0
.0
0
3
9
) 
(0
.0
0
3
9
) 
E
le
ct
E
q
 
0
.0
1
5
0
**
*  
0
.0
1
8
8
**
*  
0
.0
1
8
0
**
*  
0
.0
1
5
1
**
*  
0
.0
1
6
2
**
*  
0
.0
0
9
9
*  
0
.0
1
5
3
**
*  
0
.0
1
4
0
**
 
 (
0
.0
0
5
6
) 
(0
.0
0
5
5
) 
(0
.0
0
5
5
) 
(0
.0
0
5
6
) 
(0
.0
0
5
5
) 
(0
.0
0
5
4
) 
(0
.0
0
5
5
) 
(0
.0
0
5
6
) 
T
ra
n
sp
 
−
0
.0
0
3
2
 
0
.0
0
0
7
 
−
0
.0
0
0
2
 
−
0
.0
0
3
0
 
−
0
.0
0
2
3
 
−
0
.0
0
2
7
 
−
0
.0
0
2
4
 
−
0
.0
0
3
5
 
 (
0
.0
0
6
3
) 
(0
.0
0
6
4
) 
(0
.0
0
6
4
) 
(0
.0
0
6
2
) 
(0
.0
0
6
2
) 
(0
.0
0
6
0
) 
(0
.0
0
6
2
) 
(0
.0
0
6
2
) 
S
ci
en
ti
fi
cI
n
st
 
0
.0
0
6
4
 
0
.0
0
6
5
 
0
.0
0
6
4
 
0
.0
0
6
6
 
0
.0
0
6
6
 
0
.0
0
7
9
 
0
.0
0
6
7
 
0
.0
0
7
3
 
 (
0
.0
0
5
6
) 
(0
.0
0
5
7
) 
(0
.0
0
5
7
) 
(0
.0
0
5
6
) 
(0
.0
0
5
6
) 
(0
.0
0
5
3
) 
(0
.0
0
5
7
) 
(0
.0
0
5
6
) 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
 
0
.0
0
1
2
 
−
0
.0
0
1
1
 
−
0
.0
0
2
5
 
−
0
.0
0
0
5
 
0
.0
0
2
7
 
0
.0
0
3
0
 
−
0
.0
0
0
9
 
−
0
.0
0
0
9
 
 (
0
.0
0
6
2
) 
(0
.0
0
6
0
) 
(0
.0
0
6
0
) 
(0
.0
0
6
2
) 
(0
.0
0
6
2
) 
(0
.0
0
6
1
) 
(0
.0
0
6
0
) 
(0
.0
0
6
2
) 
U
ti
lit
ie
s 
−
0
.0
1
5
5
*  
−
0
.0
1
4
6
*  
−
0
.0
1
6
5
*  
−
0
.0
1
5
6
*  
−
0
.0
1
5
2
*  
−
0
.0
1
2
7
 
−
0
.0
1
4
3
*  
−
0
.0
1
5
0
*  
 (
0
.0
0
8
4
) 
(0
.0
0
8
4
) 
(0
.0
0
8
5
) 
(0
.0
0
8
3
) 
(0
.0
0
8
3
) 
(0
.0
0
8
2
) 
(0
.0
0
8
2
) 
(0
.0
0
8
3
) 
R
et
ai
l 
0
.0
1
0
7
**
 
0
.0
1
5
8
**
*  
0
.0
1
4
5
**
*  
0
.0
1
0
6
**
 
0
.0
1
0
8
**
 
0
.0
0
6
9
 
0
.0
1
1
7
**
 
0
.0
1
0
1
**
 
 (
0
.0
0
4
9
) 
(0
.0
0
5
0
) 
(0
.0
0
5
0
) 
(0
.0
0
4
8
) 
(0
.0
0
4
8
) 
(0
.0
0
4
8
) 
(0
.0
0
4
8
) 
(0
.0
0
4
8
) 
F
in
S
er
v
 
−
0
.0
0
4
3
 
−
0
.0
0
5
5
 
−
0
.0
0
6
0
 
−
0
.0
0
4
2
 
−
0
.0
0
3
5
 
−
0
.0
0
2
1
 
−
0
.0
0
4
2
 
−
0
.0
0
3
6
 
 (
0
.0
0
4
9
) 
(0
.0
0
4
6
) 
(0
.0
0
4
6
) 
(0
.0
0
4
9
) 
(0
.0
0
4
9
) 
(0
.0
0
4
7
) 
(0
.0
0
4
9
) 
(0
.0
0
4
9
) 
H
ea
lt
h
 
−
0
.0
0
1
9
 
0
.0
0
2
2
 
0
.0
0
2
3
 
−
0
.0
0
1
6
 
−
0
.0
0
2
1
 
−
0
.0
0
2
6
 
−
0
.0
0
0
9
 
−
0
.0
0
1
6
 
 (
0
.0
0
9
5
) 
(0
.0
0
9
2
) 
(0
.0
0
9
4
) 
(0
.0
0
9
5
) 
(0
.0
0
9
4
) 
(0
.0
0
9
1
) 
(0
.0
0
9
4
) 
(0
.0
0
9
4
) 
C
o
n
st
an
t 
0
.1
1
9
1
**
*  
0
.0
2
3
4
 
0
.0
2
5
2
 
0
.1
0
4
3
**
*  
0
.1
0
4
9
**
*  
0
.1
1
2
0
**
*  
0
.1
0
0
3
**
*  
0
.1
2
2
3
**
*  
 (
0
.0
1
3
5
) 
(0
.0
1
7
3
) 
(0
.0
1
6
3
) 
(0
.0
1
4
5
) 
(0
.0
1
3
5
) 
(0
.0
1
2
9
) 
(0
.0
1
3
9
) 
(0
.0
1
3
7
) 
Observations 
2, 413 
2, 286 
2, 286 
2, 409 
2, 409 
2, 409 
2, 413 
2, 413 
A
d
ju
st
ed
 R
2
 
0
.3
6
0
7
 
0
.3
9
1
5
 
0
.3
9
3
5
 
0
.3
6
2
5
 
0
.3
6
6
0
 
0
.4
0
2
1
 
0
.3
6
5
9
 
0
.3
6
6
8
 
F
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
 
3
6
.8
1
4
3
**
*  
3
9
.6
8
9
6
* 
* 
* 
4
0
.0
0
8
3
**
*  
3
7
.0
2
7
3
**
*  
3
7
.5
8
0
3
**
*  
4
3
.6
1
1
6
**
*  
3
7
.6
2
9
1
**
*  
3
7
.7
7
2
0
**
* 
41 
 
 C
V
a
R
0
.9
9
 
C
V
a
R
0
.9
5
 
V
a
R
0
.9
9
 
V
a
R
0
.9
5
 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
Q
u
a
n
ti
le
 
r 
C
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
t 
p
-v
a
lu
e
 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
Q
u
a
n
ti
le
 
r 
C
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
t 
p
-v
a
lu
e
 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
Q
u
a
n
ti
le
 
r 
C
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
t 
p
-v
a
lu
e
 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
Q
u
a
n
ti
le
 
r 
C
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
t 
p
-v
a
lu
e
 
 
 
0
.2
5
,0
.5
0
 3
.5
3
8
1
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
 
0
.5
0
,0
.7
5
 1
.8
6
2
1
 
0
.0
0
1
1
 
 
0
.2
5
,0
.7
5
 4
.8
0
4
7
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
 
0
.0
5
,0
.9
5
 7
.4
4
8
4
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
OL
S 
0.00
68 
0.06
44 
C
I:
 0
.0
0
1
6
, 
0
.0
1
1
9
 
r
 
E
q
u
a
li
ty
 p
-v
a
lu
e
 
 
0
.2
5
,0
.5
0
 3
.8
3
7
8
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
 
0
.5
0
,0
.7
5
 3
.7
2
0
0
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
 
0
.2
5
,0
.7
5
 7
.1
9
8
0
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
 
0
.0
5
,0
.9
5
 4
.9
7
7
3
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
OLS
 
0.0070
 
0.0002
 
C
I:
 0
.0
0
4
7
, 
0
.0
0
9
4
 
r 
E
q
u
a
li
ty
 p
-v
a
lu
e
 
OLS
 
0.007
7 
0.000
7 
C
I:
 0
.0
0
4
8
, 
0
.0
1
0
5
 
r 
E
q
u
a
li
ty
 p
-v
a
lu
e
 
 
0
.2
5
,0
.5
0
 3
.9
6
8
8
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
 
0
.5
0
,0
.7
5
 2
.6
8
4
9
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
 
0
.2
5
,0
.7
5
 4
.4
9
9
9
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
 
0
.0
5
,0
.9
5
 5
.5
4
6
6
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
OLS
 
0.0065
 
0.0000
 
C
I:
 0
.0
0
5
0
, 
0
.0
0
8
1
 
r 
E
q
u
a
li
ty
 p
-v
a
lu
e
 
 
0
.2
5
,0
.5
0
 3
.8
2
0
7
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
 
0
.5
0
,0
.7
5
 2
.6
6
3
8
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
 
0
.2
5
,0
.7
5
 5
.7
7
8
7
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
 
0
.0
5
,0
.9
5
 6
.4
3
1
3
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
4 2  
Figure 1: 
Quantile 
Regressions for 
Initial Return 
Graphs plot Initial 
Return (InitRtn) slope 
coefficients of estimated 
linear quantile 
regressions for value-at-
risk confidence levels c 
= {0.95, 0.99} and for 
conditional value-at-risk 
confidence levels c = 
{0.95, 0.99} as a 
function of r. Quantile 
regressions have r 
values from 0.05 to 0.95 
with step size 0.05. 
Continuous black lines 
represent values of 
quantile regression 
coefficients at different 
levels of r. Grey areas 
indicate 90% confidence 
intervals of quantile 
regression coefficients. 
Continuous red lines 
represent values of least 
squares regression 
coefficients. Dashed red 
lines represent 90% 
confidence intervals of 
least squares regression 
coefficients. Tables 
across the middle row of 
the figure show 
coefficient values for 
Initial Return (InitRtn) at 
each level of r and their 
corresponding 
significance values. 
Significance levels are 
adjusted for robust 
standard errors. 
Coefficient values for all 
remaining variables 
reported in Table V to 
Table VIII are omitted 
for brevity reasons. † 
indicates that a 
coefficient in relation to 
the rth quantile is 
outside the 90% 
confidence interval (CI) 
of the least squares 
regression coefficients. 
Tables across the 
bottom row of the figure 
report tests of equality 
of quantile regression 
coefficients across 
different levels of r. F-
statistics test for 
pairwise equality of 
slope coefficients across 
different quantiles of r. 
p-values report the 
corresponding 
confidence levels of F-
tests. 
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Graphs plot 
Realised 
Spread 
(RealSp) slope 
coefficients of 
estimated 
linear quantile 
regressions for 
value-at-risk 
confidence 
levels c = {0.95, 
0.99} and for 
conditional 
value-at-risk 
confidence 
levels c = {0.95, 
0.99} as a 
function of T. 
Quantile 
regressions 
have T values 
from 0.05 to 
0.95 with step 
size 0.05. 
Continuous 
black lines 
represent 
values of 
quantile 
regression 
coefficients at 
different levels 
of T. Grey areas 
indicate 90% 
confidence 
intervals of 
quantile 
regression 
coefficients. 
Continuous red 
lines represent 
values of least 
squares 
regression 
coefficients. 
Dashed red 
lines represent 
90% confidence 
intervals of 
least squares 
regression 
coefficients. 
Tables across 
the middle row 
of the figure 
show 
coefficient 
values for 
Realised 
Spread 
(RealSp) at 
each level of T 
and their 
corresponding 
significance 
values. 
Significance 
levels are 
adjusted for 
robust 
standard 
errors. 
Coefficient 
values for all 
remaining 
variables 
reported in 
Table V to 
Table VIII are 
omitted for 
brevity 
reasons. - 
indicates that a 
coefficient in 
relation to the 
Tth quantile is 
outside the 
90% confidence 
interval (CI) of 
the least 
squares 
regression 
coefficients. 
Tables across 
the bottom row 
of the figure 
report tests of 
equality of 
quantile 
regression 
coefficients 
across different 
levels of T. F-
statistics test 
for pairwise 
equality of 
slope 
coefficients 
across different 
quantiles of T. 
p-values report 
the 
corresponding 
confidence 
levels of F-
tests. 
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Figure 4: 
Quantile 
Regressions for 
Kyle’s λ 
Graphs plot Kyle’s (1985) 
A (Kyle A) slope 
coefficients of estimated 
linear quantile 
regressions for value-at-
risk confidence levels c = 
{0.95, 0.99} and for 
conditional value-at-risk 
confidence levels c = 
{0.95, 0.99} as a 
function of T. Quantile 
regressions have T 
values from 0.05 to 0.95 
with step size 0.05. 
Continuous black lines 
represent values of 
quantile regression 
coefficients at different 
levels of T. Grey areas 
indicate 90% confidence 
intervals of quantile 
regression coefficients. 
Continuous red lines 
represent values of least 
squares regression 
coefficients. Dashed red 
lines represent 90% 
confidence intervals of 
least squares regression 
coefficients. Tables 
across the middle row of 
the figure show 
coefficient values for 
Kyle’s (1985) A (Kyle A) 
at each level of T and 
their corresponding 
significance values. 
Significance levels are 
adjusted for robust 
standard errors. 
Coefficient values for all 
remaining variables 
reported in Table V to 
Table VIII are omitted for 
brevity reasons. - 
indicates that a 
coefficient in relation to 
the Tth quantile is outside 
the 90% confidence 
interval (CI) of the least 
squares regression 
coefficients. Tables 
across the bottom row of 
the figure report tests of 
equality of quantile 
regression coefficients 
across different levels of 
T. F-statistics test for 
pairwise equality of slope 
coefficients across 
different quantiles of T. 
p-values report the 
corresponding 
confidence levels of F-
tests. 
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46  
Figure 5: 
Quantile 
Regressions for 
Kyle’s λ CN 
Graphs plot Kyle’s 
(1985) A CN (Kyle A 
CN) slope coefficients 
of estimated linear 
quantile regressions 
for value-at-risk 
confidence levels c = 
{0.95, 0.99} and for 
conditional value-at-
risk confidence levels c 
= {0.95, 0.99} as a 
function of T. Quantile 
regressions have T 
values from 0.05 to 
0.95 with step size 
0.05. Continuous 
black lines represent 
values of quantile 
regression coefficients 
at different levels of T. 
Grey areas indicate 
90% confidence 
intervals of quantile 
regression coefficients. 
Continuous red lines 
represent values of 
least squares 
regression coefficients. 
Dashed red lines 
represent 90% 
confidence intervals of 
least squares 
regression coefficients. 
Tables across the 
middle row of the 
figure show coefficient 
values for Kyle’s (1985) 
A CN (Kyle A CN) at 
each level of T and 
their corresponding 
significance values. 
Significance levels are 
adjusted for robust 
standard errors. 
Coefficient values for 
all remaining variables 
reported in Table V to 
Table VIII are omitted 
for brevity reasons. - 
indicates that a 
coefficient in relation 
to the Tth quantile is 
outside the 90% 
confidence interval (CI) 
of the least squares 
regression coefficients. 
Tables across the 
bottom row of the 
figure report tests of 
equality of quantile 
regression coefficients 
across different levels 
of T. F-statistics test 
for pairwise equality of 
slope coefficients 
across different 
quantiles of T. p-values 
report the 
corresponding 
confidence levels of F-
tests. 
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Graphs plot 
Turnover 
(Turnover) 
slope 
coefficients of 
estimated 
linear quantile 
regressions for 
value-at-risk 
confidence 
levels c = 
{0.95, 0.99} 
and for 
conditional 
value-at-risk 
confidence 
levels c = 
{0.95, 0.99} as 
a function of 
r. Quantile 
regressions 
have r values 
from 0.05 to 
0.95 with step 
size 0.05. 
Continuous 
black lines 
represent 
values of 
quantile 
regression 
coefficients at 
different levels 
of r. Grey 
areas indicate 
90% 
confidence 
intervals of 
quantile 
regression 
coefficients. 
Continuous 
red lines 
represent 
values of least 
squares 
regression 
coefficients. 
Dashed red 
lines represent 
90% 
confidence 
intervals of 
least squares 
regression 
coefficients. 
Tables across 
the middle row 
of the figure 
show 
coefficient 
values for 
turnover 
(Turnover) at 
each level of r 
and their 
corresponding 
significance 
values. 
Significance 
levels are 
adjusted for 
robust 
standard 
errors. 
Coefficient 
values for all 
remaining 
variables 
reported in 
Table V to 
Table VIII are 
omitted for 
brevity 
reasons. † 
indicates that 
a coefficient in 
relation to the 
rth quantile is 
outside the 
90% 
confidence 
interval (CI) of 
the least 
squares 
regression 
coefficients. 
Tables across 
the bottom 
row of the 
figure report 
tests of 
equality of 
quantile 
regression 
coefficients 
across 
different levels 
of r. F-
statistics test 
for pairwise 
equality of 
slope 
coefficients 
across 
different 
quantiles of r. 
p-values 
report the 
corresponding 
confidence 
levels of F-
tests. 
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Figure 9: 
Quantile 
Regressions 
for 
Underwriter 
Reputation 
Graphs plot 
underwriter 
reputation (UwRank) 
slope coefficients of 
estimated linear 
quantile regressions 
for value-at-risk 
confidence levels c = 
{0.95, 0.99} as a 
function of T. 
Quantile regressions 
have T values from 
0.05 to 0.95 with step 
size 0.05. Continuous 
black lines represent 
values of quantile 
regression coefficients 
at different levels of T. 
Grey areas indicate 
90% confidence 
intervals of quantile 
regression 
coefficients. 
Continuous red lines 
represent values of 
least squares 
regression 
coefficients. Dashed 
red lines represent 
90% confidence 
intervals of least 
squares regression 
coefficients. Tables 
across the middle row 
of the figure show 
coefficient values for 
underwriter 
reputation (UwRank) 
at each level of T and 
their corresponding 
significance values. 
Significance levels are 
adjusted for robust 
standard errors. 
Coefficient values for 
all remaining 
variables reported in 
Table V to Table VIII 
are omitted for brevity 
reasons. indicates 
that a coefficient in 
relation to the Tth 
quantile is outside 
the 90% confidence 
interval (CI) of the 
least squares 
regression 
coefficients. Tables 
across the bottom row 
of the figure report 
tests of equality of 
quantile regression 
coefficients across 
different levels of T. F-
statistics test for 
pairwise equality of 
slope coefficients 
across different 
quantiles of T. p-
values report the 
corresponding 
confidence levels of F-
tests. 
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Figure 10: 
Quantile 
Regressions for 
Number of 
Underwriters in 
Syndicate 
Graphs plot the number 
of underwriters in a 
syndicate (NumUW) 
slope coefficients of 
estimated linear quantile 
regressions for value-at-
risk confidence levels c = 
{0.95, 0.99} as a 
function of T. Quantile 
regressions have T values 
from 0.05 to 0.95 with 
step size 0.05. 
Continuous black lines 
represent values of 
quantile regression 
coefficients at different 
levels of T. Grey areas 
indicate 90% confidence 
intervals of quantile 
regression coefficients. 
Continuous red lines 
represent values of least 
squares regression 
coefficients. Dashed red 
lines represent 90% 
confidence intervals of 
least squares regression 
coefficients. Tables 
across the middle row of 
the figure show 
coefficient values for 
number of underwriters 
in a syndicate (NumUW) 
at each level of T and 
their corresponding 
significance values. 
Significance levels are 
adjusted for robust 
standard errors. 
Coefficient values for all 
remaining variables 
reported in Table V to 
Table VIII are omitted 
for brevity reasons. 
indicates that a 
coefficient in relation to 
the Tth quantile is outside 
the 90% confidence 
interval (CI) of the least 
squares regression 
coefficients. Tables 
across the bottom row of 
the figure report tests of 
equality of quantile 
regression coefficients 
across different levels of 
T. F-statistics test for 
pairwise equality of slope 
coefficients across 
different quantiles of T. 
p-values report the 
corresponding 
confidence levels of F-
tests. 
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Graphs plot 
venture 
capital-
backed (V C 
− backed) 
slope 
coefficients 
of estimated 
linear 
quantile 
regressions 
for value-at-
risk 
confidence 
levels c = 
{0.95, 0.99} 
as a 
function of 
r. Quantile 
regressions 
have r 
values from 
0.05 to 0.95 
with step 
size 0.05. 
Continuous 
black lines 
represent 
values of 
quantile 
regression 
coefficients 
at different 
levels of r. 
Grey areas 
indicate 
90% 
confidence 
intervals of 
quantile 
regression 
coefficients. 
Continuous 
red lines 
represent 
values of 
least 
squares 
regression 
coefficients. 
Dashed red 
lines 
represent 
90% 
confidence 
intervals of 
least 
squares 
regression 
coefficients. 
Tables 
across the 
middle row 
of the figure 
show 
coefficient 
values for 
venture 
capital-
backed IPOs 
(V C − 
backed) at 
each level of 
r and their 
correspondi
ng 
significance 
values. 
Significance 
levels are 
adjusted for 
robust 
standard 
errors. 
Coefficient 
values for 
all 
remaining 
variables 
reported in 
Table V to 
Table VIII 
are omitted 
for brevity 
reasons. f 
indicates 
that a 
coefficient 
in relation 
to the rth 
quantile is 
outside the 
90% 
confidence 
interval (CI) 
of the least 
squares 
regression 
coefficients. 
Tables 
across the 
bottom row 
of the figure 
report tests 
of equality 
of quantile 
regression 
coefficients 
across 
different 
levels of r. 
F-statistics 
test for 
pairwise 
equality of 
slope 
coefficients 
across 
different 
quantiles of 
r. p-values 
report the 
correspondi
ng 
confidence 
levels of F-
tests. 
